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The Transformation of  Federal 
Disaster Policy since 1803 
David A. Moss 
8.1  Introduction: Disasters in America, 1543-1993 
Natural catastrophes have always plagued the residents of what are now the 
United States. One of the earliest disasters on record dates to 1543, when the 
explorer Hernando de Soto witnessed the full fury of the Mississippi River. 
According to Garcilaso de la Vega (1951,554), who chronicled de Soto’s voy- 
age, “That which previously  had been forests and fields was converted now 
into a sea, for from each bank the water extended across more than twenty 
leagues  [about sixty miles]  of terrain. All  of  this distance was navigable  in 
canoes and nothing was visible except the pine needles and branches of the 
highest trees.” The flood of  1543 surely affected the Native Americans who 
lived and hunted in the Mississippi valley at that time. But the human signifi- 
cance of this type of disaster was transformed as the density of population and 
settlement increased sharply with the arrival of  the Europeans, the founding 
of  a new nation, and the rapid economic growth seen in the nineteenth cen- 
tury. As a congressional task force subsequently observed, “Floods are an act 
of God; flood damages result from acts of  men” (Un$ed  National Program 
1966, 14). 
David A. Moss is associate professor at the Harvard Business School. 
Much of  the material in  this chapter, particularly the sections summarizing disaster history 
through 1993, is excerpted with permission from the Harvard Business School case study, “The 
Great Mississippi Flood in  1993,” no. 797-097, prepared by  David Moss and Julie Rosenbaum. 
Copyright 0  1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College; all rights reserved. 
Generous financial support was provided by the NBER and by  the Division of Research at the 
Harvard Business School. The author benefited greatly from the suggestions of Alexander Dyck, 
Ken Froot, Julio Rotemberg, and Bruce Scott as well as from the comments of the two reviewers 
at the conference, Clement Dwyer and R. Glenn Hubbard. The author owes special thanks to Julie 
Rosenbaum for her superb research on U.S. disaster policy and to Jean-Marc Dreyfus for his 
careful work on disaster policy in France. 
307 308  David A. Moss 
By 1927, the year of another massive flood in the lower Mississippi valley, 
the region was crowded with homes, farms, and other businesses. Once again, 
the river swelled to about sixty miles in width, inundating over  16.5 million 
acres of land in 170 counties (a land area roughly the size of Ireland). Several 
hundred people lost their lives as a result of the 1927 flood, over half a million 
were left temporarily homeless, and damages were estimated at $300 million, 
or almost $3 billion in 1993 dollars (American National Red Cross 1929, 10, 
120-21; Daniel 1977, lo).’ 
When the next great flood struck the upper Mississippi region in 1993, the 
economic effect was even greater. An estimated 20 million acres flooded or 
were too waterlogged to support crops, leading the Soil Conservation Service 
to state with only some exaggeration that “it was as though a sixth Great Lake, 
centered around northern Iowa, had sprung up in the Midwest” (Phillips 1994, 
18). The 1993 flood inflicted considerably less human misery than its predeces- 
sor in  1927: thirty-eight  lives were lost and fifty-five thousand persons dis- 
placed. Yet the economic effect of the 1993 flood was much greater. Analysts 
estimated overall damages at between $12 and $16 billion (National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration 1994, pp. 1.4-1.5; Facts on File 1993; Freivo- 
gel 1993; Sheets 1993,67; Sharing the Challenge 1994, 16). 
Of  course, floods are only  one type of  natural  disaster. Those organiza- 
tions-both  public and private-charged  with aiding disaster victims must 
also address  hurricanes,  tornadoes, earthquakes, mudslides,  and  numerous 
other calamities. But the great Mississippi  floods just described provide an 
ideal baseline against which to measure changes in public expectations and 
government responsibilities in the United States in time of disaster. 
In response to the massive Mississippi Flood of  1927, the federal govern- 
ment and the American National  Red Cross organized the biggest disaster- 
relief effort in U.S. history to that time. As was customary, Calvin Coolidge, 
president of the United States, was also president of the American National 
Red Cross.* On 22 April 1927, he announced: 
The Government is giving such aid as lies within its power. Government 
boats that are available are being used to rescue those in danger and carry 
refugees to safety. The War  Department  is providing the Red Cross with 
tents for housing refugees. The National Guard, State and local authorities 
are  assisting.  But  the burden  of  caring  for the homeless  rests  upon  the 
agency designated by Government charter to provide relief in disaster-The 
American National Red Cross. For so great a task additional funds must be 
obtained immediately. 
It therefore becomes my duty as President of the United States and Presi- 
dent of  the American National  Red Cross to direct the sympathy of  our 
1. There is some dispute over the number of flood-related fatalities in 1927.  At the time, officials 
insisted that fatalities numbered fewer than  10, but Daniel has since estimated the number at 
between 250 and 500 (see also Koenig 1993). 
2. See the discussion below of  the founding and evolution of the American National Red Cross. 309  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
people to the sad plight of thousands of their fellow citizens, and to urge that 
generous contributions be promptly forthcoming to alleviate their suffering. 
(American National Red Cross 1929, 13) 
As Coolidge suggested, the federal government and the Red Cross worked to- 
gether in the relief effort, but the latter carried most of  the financial burden. 
Federal  assistance remained  limited  mainly  to  the  lending  of  government 
equipment and personnel and to placing the bully pulpit of the presidency at 
the disposal of private fund-raising efforts. Although Coolidge refused to call 
a special session of Congress as some representatives from the affekted states 
urged, he did direct his commerce secretary, Herbert Hoover, to help run the 
relief  effort and  ordered  the  rest  of  his  cabinet to  assist when  necessary. 
Through various agencies, the federal government spent about $10 million (or 
3.3 percent of  total damages) on relief. The Red Cross, by  comparison, col- 
lected $17.5 million in cash donations as well as another $6 million in in-kind 
contributions. It also provided emergency services, including food and shelter, 
to more than 600,000 flood victims over a fourteen-month period (see Lohof 
1968, esp. 122, 169-70,  185; American National Red Cross 1929, 10-13).3 
Herbert Hoover viewed the efforts of the Red Cross in 1927 as enormously 
successful. By today’s standards, the dollar amounts were minuscule and the 
reimbursement rates small. Together, the states, the federal government, and 
the Red  Cross covered only about  13 percent of  total damages. But, by  the 
standards of the time, the effort appeared herculean. Hoover declared that the 
Red Cross had “become the one guarantee to the American people that loss of 
life shall be prevented in calamity and that suffering shall be mitigated to the 
utmost degree” (quoted in American National Red Cross 1929, 145). Writing 
his memoirs a decade later, Hoover recalled with pride the relief efforts of 
1927. Obviously dismayed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s expansionary 
New Deal policies, Hoover noted that private sources had provided the bulk of 
assistance in  1927. “Those were the days,” he wrote nostalgically, “when cit- 
izens expected to take care of  one another in time of  disaster and it had not 
occurred to them that the Federal Government should do it” (Hoover 1952, 
2:  126). 
By 1993, however, Hoover’s worst fears appeared to have been realized since 
just about everyone expected the federal government to bail out the victims 
of  that year’s  Great Mississippi Flood.  By  late July, President Clinton had 
declared all of  Iowa  and multiple counties in eight other midwestern states 
federal disaster areas. With the passage in August of Public Law (PL) 103-75 
(Emergency Supplemental  Appropriations  1993), a large emergency supple- 
mental appropriation, a host of federal agencies ranging from the Army Corps 
of Engineers to the Federal Highway Administration swung into action. Most 
important of  all was the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
which oversaw much of the relief effort. 
3. The affected states added roughly another $10 million in relief appropriations. 310  David A. Moss 
As the emergency requests made their way through Congress beginning in 
July, there was no significant disagreement about whether the federal govem- 
ment should undertake a massive relief effort. Instead, legislators mainly de- 
bated how the bailout should be financed. “What is at stake here,” Representa- 
tive Gerald Solomon (R-New York) stated, “is a very important principle, and 
that is whether we are willing to find other means to pay for these disaster as- 
sistance costs or whether we will simply let them add to the deficit. That is how 
we got in this awful sea of red ink that we are in today” (Congressional Rec- 
ord 139 [22  July 19931: H.5001). 
Three House members sponsored “pay-as-you-go” amendments to the Mid- 
west aid bill that sought to offset disaster spending with cuts to other govern- 
ment agencies. Representative Jim Slattery (D-Kansas) proposed a 1 percent 
across-the-board reduction in fiscal 1994 discretionary spending, while Repre- 
sentatives Timothy Penny (D-Minnesota) and Jim Nussle (R-Iowa) suggested 
trimming roughly $3 billion from the budgets of a variety of federal agencies, 
including the FBI, the Coast Guard, OSHA, and NASA (Congressional Record 
139 [22 July  19931: H5002, H5006). In support of cost-offsetting measures, 
Representative Mac Collins (R-Georgia) declared, “At a time of  tight budgets, 
spending Federal dollars to help those flood victims is more important than 
spending 900-plus million dollars on direct aid to  Russia or spending $1.9 
[billion] on a space station or $300 million on additional health care benefits 
to illegal aliens and spending millions of taxpayer dollars on the National En- 
dowment for the Arts” (Congressional Record  139 [20 July  19931: H4783). 
But, as other members of Congress maintained, these were not necessarily pro- 
grams that the government should sacrifice just because a flood had struck 
unexpectedly in the Midwest. 
Stalled on 22 July by a bipartisan coalition of  fiscal conservatives, the aid 
bill came again to the House floor the following week. This time, members 
from flood-stricken districts helped push it through without any pay-as-you- 
go provisions. The human tragedy  that was unfolding simply overwhelmed 
arguments about fiscal responsibility. Said one congressman, “If you ask the 
American in the Midwest who is paddling towards his living room or watching 
his business go down the drain whether he wants us to sit here today and have 
a budget discussion or whether he wants to pass disaster aid, I submit he would 
say, ‘I want disaster aid‘ ” (Albert R. Wynn [D-Maryland], quoted in JSrauss 
1993). Cognizant of mounting public pressure, the Senate quickly followed the 
House and approved the disaster-aid bill on 4 August. 
By this point, the package had swelled from President Clinton’s initial $2.5 
billion request to $6.3 billion, or about half of total estimated damages. Repre- 
sentatives from the affected states sympathized with President Clinton’s con- 
cerns about the deficit but insisted that their constituents were in the midst of 
a crisis and that $2.5 billion was not nearly enough to help them (see Hegger 
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The increase to $6.3  billion resulted from a long list of  additional pleas for 
assistance,  most  of  which  seemed  perfectly  reasonable  under  the  circum- 
stances. Senators Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Christopher Bond (R-Missouri), 
for example, succeeded in changing the formula for calculating crop-loss pay- 
ments to farmers. Their more generous provisions added nearly $1 billion to 
the package. Said Senator Harkin, “Now I say it’s time to quit letting OMB 
twist our tails. . . .  Agriculture is all there is.”4 
Although no serious opposition to the relief appropriation ever emerged, the 
congressional debate nonetheless revealed considerable discomfort with the 
direction of federal disaster policy. As has been mentioned, some lawmakers 
expressed concern that the cost of federal disaster relief was becoming unman- 
ageable. Robert C. Byrd, chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, re- 
peatedly cautioned his colleagues against fiscal excess, asserting that “disasters 
are not spending opportunities” (quoted in Dewar 1993). 
Others worried that a knee-jerk federal policy was rewarding personal irre- 
sponsibility on the part of home- and business owners in floodplains and other 
disaster areas. As Representative Fred Grandy (R-Iowa) observed, “We’re basi- 
cally telling people,  ‘We want you  to buy insurance, but if  you don’t, we’ll 
bail you out anyway”’ (quoted in Benenson  1993). By this logic, the federal 
government was contributing to a potentially enormous moral hazard problem. 
Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado) asked on the House floor, “As 
we watch this tremendously awful flood scene unravel in the Midwest . . . and 
we look at the terrific debt, we are going to have to make some very difficult 
choices. One of the main choices will be: Do we help those who took responsi- 
bility, got flood insurance, put up levees, tried to do everything they could; or 
do we help those who did not do that, who risked it all and figured if all fails, 
the Federal Government will bail them out?’ (Congressional Record  139 [19 
July 19931: H4760). 
Politicians from the affected states showed little patience with such ques- 
tions. “This is not a time for debating the fine points of long-term policy,” ex- 
claimed Governor Me1 Carnahan of Missouri. “We have acted in other disas- 
ters, whether they be hurricanes, whether they be earthquakes, whether they 
be other floods. We even acted to help Kurdistan and the savings and loans” 
(quoted in Hegger  1993). Victims of  the Mississippi Flood, he maintained, 
deserved no less. Echoing these sentiments, Governor Jim Edgar of Illinois 
4. Originally, Senators Thad Cochran (D-Mississippi) and Robert J. Dole (R-Kansas) had sought 
to win support in Congress for a much bigger increase in farm payments by agreeing to make the 
changed formula retroactive to  1990. Farm  disaster assistance had been cut from forty-two to 
twenty-one cents per dollar lost in 1990 in order to address budget constraints. The Clinton admin- 
istration rejected the Cochran-Dole initiative on the grounds that it would cost an additional $3.4 
billion. According to the Washington  Post, Harkin and Bond won administration support for their 
less costly proposal, which included no retroactive payments, “after phone calls to the White 
House” (Dewar 1993, A19; see also “$5.7-Billion Disaster Relief Bill Is Approved” 1993; “Senate 
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asserted that the Great Flood was “just as serious a problem for the country as 
war. I don’t think anyone is expecting 100 percent reimbursement, but it has to 
be adequate” (quoted in Freemantle 1993). 
In the end, warnings about fiscal excess and moral hazard proved no match 
for the politics of relief in the middle of a catastrophe. The massive appropri- 
ation was passed overwhelmingly in both houses of Congress, and President 
Clinton did not hesitate when given the opportunity to sign it.5 
The key question now, in the aftermath of the 1993 flood and several other 
record-breaking catastrophes of the last few years, is whether federal disaster 
policy can be rationalized or, alternatively, whether the politics of  relief will 
remain as uncontrollable in the future as they have been in the recent past. 
With federal disaster spending since the mid- 1970s averaging about $7 billion 
annually (in constant 1993 dollars), and with every indication that the figure 
will rise in the years ahead, policymakers in Washington have good reason to 
be concerned. The remainder of this paper will offer some perspective on the 
problem by examining the history of federal disaster relief, surveying how di- 
saster policy actually works today, and suggesting a practical proposal for re- 
forming the system. 
8.2  A Brief History of Federal Disaster Policy 
8.2.1  Ad Hoc Relief, 1803-1947 
The first known instance of the federal government providing relief to disas- 
ter victims dates to 1803, when Congress granted the victims of a fire in Ports- 
mouth, New Hampshire, an extension on the repayment of customhouse bonds. 
Between  1803 and  1947, various floods, earthquakes, and fires prompted at 
least 128 specific legislative acts offering ad hoc relief. In most cases, the acts 
authorized the purchase and distribution of  provisions and medical supplies 
(see Congressional Record 96, pt. 9 [7 August 19501: 11900-11902). Despite 
the frequency of such legislation, the federal government did not view disaster 
relief as an ongoing federal responsibility. More often than not, the federal 
government provided no assistance at all in the aftermath of a disaster.6  In the 
mid-1  880s, for example, President Grover Cleveland vetoed a bill that would 
have appropriated $10,000  for the distribution of seed to the victims of a severe 
drought in Texas. He explained: 
5. The House of Representatives passed the emergency supplemental appropriation bill by  a 
vote of 400  to 27 on 27 July. The bill was then favorably reported to the full Senate by a unanimous 
29 to 0 vote of the Senate Appropriations Committee on 30 July. The full Senate passed the bill by 
a voice vote on 4 August, and President Clinton signed it into law (as PL 103-75) eight days later. 
6. Whereas between 1803 and 1947 the federal government provided disaster relief, on average, 
less than once per year, between 1977 and 1993 it provided assistance, on average, for thirty-four 
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I can find no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution; and I do 
not believe that the power and duty of the General Government ought to be 
extended to the relief of individual suffering which is in no manner properly 
related to the public service or benefit. A prevalent tendency to disregard the 
limited mission of this power and duty should, I think, be steadfastly re- 
sisted, to the end that the lesson should be constantly enforced that though 
the people support the Government, the Government should not support the 
people. . . . Federal aid in [cases of misfortune] encourages the expectation 
of paternal care on the part of the Government and weakens the sturdiness 
of our national character, while it prevents the indulgence among our people 
of that kindly sentiment and conduct which strengthen the bonds of a com- 
mon brotherhood. (“President Cleveland’s Veto Statement” 1887) 
Clara Barton, who traveled to Texas during the drought and reported that 
relief efforts there could be handled out of local resources, supported Cleve- 
land‘s position (Barton to Cleveland 1887; see also Hurd 1959,77-78). Barton, 
then in her sixties, was herself a major figure in the history of American disas- 
ter relief. She had founded the American National Red Cross in  1881 and, 
more than anyone else, was responsible for transforming it into a quasi-public 
disaster agen~y.~ 
In  1905, Congress passed  a bill  designating the American  National  Red 
Cross the official agent of the federal government in providing disaster relief. 
Ever since its founding, the Red Cross had raised and distributed private funds 
to aid the victims of disasters. But, after 1905, these services became the organ- 
ization’s legal responsibility. Congress had appropriated no new funds but sim- 
ply assigned to this volunteer association the task of raising relief aid through 
private means (see Hurd  1959, 111-12).  The biggest test of America’s quasi- 
public system of disaster relief came twenty-two years later, during the Great 
Mississippi Flood of 1927. As has been mentioned, the Red Cross carried most 
of the burden in a large-scale cooperative relief effort that included state and 
federal agencies. 
8.2.2  Flood Control 
Although Congress appropriated only $10 million for relief and reconstruc- 
tion associated with the 1927 flood, it spent nearly $300 million the following 
year on flood-control projects along the lower Mississippi (Lohof 1968, 243- 
4.4). Indeed, it was at this point in time that flood control began to be accepted 
primarily as a job for the federal government. 
Communities had historically employed flood-control works such as levees 
to protect low-lying property. Through most of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, individual proprietors, towns, and states had assumed responsibility 
for levee construction and maintenance. But their uncoordinated efforts some- 
7. Barton spelled out her understanding of  the role of her organization in Barton to Cleveland 
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times worked at cross-purposes and frequently made the situation worse: in 
channeling floodwaters away from one person’s land, a levee usually pointed it 
in the direction of a neighbor’s. By 1879, the need for improved navigation and 
flood control on the Mississippi had prompted the federal government’s direct 
involvement. Established that year as a permanent agency of the War Depart- 
ment, the Mississippi River Commission focused specifically on regulation 
and coordination of private-sector efforts.* 
Over subsequent decades, a series of devastating floods sparked debate over 
the extent to which the federal government should assume responsibility for 
providing protection. Local Midwest businessmen, among others, lobbied for 
a sustained financial ~ommitment.~  Congress passed the first flood control act 
(PL 64-367)  in 1917 and a second six years later. Both acts authorized flood 
control as part  of  the Mississippi  River Commission’s work,  appropriating 
roughly $10 million annually for such projects. Still, the legislation empha- 
sized local responsibility.’O  The Mississippi River Commission worked with 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to repair and strengthen levee systems. As 
early as 1926, the Corps’ chief of engineers had claimed that these improve- 
ments made for a safe navigation channel and could now “prevent the destruc- 
tive effects of  floods” (quoted in Daniel  1977, 6). The historic Mississippi 
River Flood of  1927 may have proved him wrong, but it did not shake confi- 
dence in the efficacy of  flood control. Indeed, it spurred increased federal par- 
ticipation and the building of ever bigger and better works. 
Following the $300 million appropriation in  1928, Congress formally de- 
clared flood control a federal responsibility in the Flood Control Acts of  1936 
and 1938. The 1938 act authorized 100 percent federal financing of dams and 
reservoirs. Focused on the reclamation of land for agricultural and commercial 
enterprises, the Army Corps of Engineers concentrated its efforts on structural 
approaches to flood protection  such as reservoirs, levees, channels, and the 
diversion of major rivers.” 
8.2.3  Toward a Permanent Federal Role in Disaster Relief, 1947-93 
Meanwhile, the federal government had begun taking more responsibility 
for disaster relief. In the wake of several natural catastrophes during the 1930s, 
the Federal Relief Administration and the Federal Civil Works Administration 
8. On the history of flood-control efforts, see Daniel (1977, 5-7),  Lohof (1968, 214-44),  and 
Hoyt and Langbein (1955, 138-61). 
9. In 1913, e.g., Midwest businessmen presented their case for federal involvement at a congres- 
sional hearing on the subject. “There is not now any question,” they declared, “as to the right and 
duty of the National Government to make necessary appropriations for the care and regulation of 
the water highways of  the country-its  own property” (see  Mississippi Rives Hearings on H.R. 
1749 1913, 31). 
10. Local authorities were to contribute not less than one-third of the cost of construction and 
repair (see “A Brief Chronology” 1928). 
11. By  1993, the Army Corps of  Engineers maintained about 275 levees in  the Mississippi 
region alone (see Facts on File 1993,624 E3; see also Koenig 1993, IA). 315  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
received authority from President Franklin Roosevelt to distribute surplus fed- 
eral property to state and local governments and to repair damaged roads and 
bridges. Congress formalized this practice in 1947 when it passed the first gen- 
eral disaster relief act. In the event of a disaster, local governments could turn 
to the War Assets Administration or the Federal Works Administration. These 
agencies processed requests and arranged for the delivery of  surplus federal 
property. 
The major turning point in government involvement, however, came in 1950 
with the passage of PL 81-875. (For a chronology of  federal disaster legisla- 
tion, see table 8.1.) Known as the Disaster ReliefAct of  1950, the law created 
a permanent relief fund and gave the president broad discretionary power to 
decide what constituted a disaster eligible for federal aid. While the Red Cross 
continued to manage the distribution of  relief to private citizens and busi- 
nesses, the federal government now assumed responsibility for the repair and 
restoration of local government facilities.I2 
Through the 1950s and early 1960s, the federal government broadened and 
refined the contours of the 1950 law-in  most cases with little debate or con- 
troversy. The 1951 Kansas-Missouri Flood, for example, led Congress to au- 
thorize emergency housing for disaster victims. Several years later, rural com- 
munities, unincorporated towns, and state facilities became eligible for federal 
assistance, as did Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pa- 
cific Islands. Relief acts passed in 1964 and 1965 in response to disasters in 
multiple states (including a severe earthquake in Alaska, floods in the Pacific 
Northwest, and Hurricane Betsy in the Southeast) increased federal contribu- 
tions to highway reconstruction and expanded federal loan programs, such as 
those of the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Farmers Home Ad- 
ministration (FmHA) (see Office of  Emergency Preparedness 1972, 1:  168- 
70).13  A proposed 1966 disaster relief bill to expand the range of federal assis- 
tance prompted a number of  congressmen to declare that the time had come 
for the federal government to provide relief on a “uniform, nationwide basis” 
(Congressional  Record 112, pt. 20 [17 October 19661: 27096-27097). Indeed, 
step by  step, the federal role in disaster relief had been transformed. Whereas 
in 1953 Red Cross assistance outpaced federal spending on disasters by a ratio 
of  1.6  to 1, by  1965 federal disaster aid exceeded Red Cross spending on disas- 
ters by  nearly 8 to 1 (Dacy and Kunreuther 1969, table 2-1, p. 32).14 
12. On the legislative history of  federal disaster relief, see esp. May  (1985,  17-47);  Popkin 
(1990); Federal Disasrer Assistance  (1995, 99-102);  Office of Emergency Preparedness (1972, 
1:167-73);  and Kunreuther (1973,3-21). 
13. Kunreuther (1973.9) maintains that the earthquake in Alaska “marked a turning point in the 
federal government’s  role in disaster relief. The seventy of the damage caused concern that, unless 
the SBA liberalized its [loan] policy, many individuals would not qualify for a disaster loan be- 
cause of  their inability to pay  off  their old mortgages and other debts and still make monthly 
payments to the SBA.” 
14. In calculating total federal spending on disasters in 1953 and 1965, a subsidy rate on SBA 
loans of 33 percent was assumed. Table 8.1  Federal Disaster Legislation, 1950-94 
1950, PL 81-875 
1951, PL82-107 
1953, PL 83-134 
1962, PL 87-502 
1966. PL 89-769 
1968, PL 90-448 
1969, PL 91-79 
1970, PL 91-606 
1974, PL 93-288 
1980, PL 96-365 
1988, PL 100-707 
1994, PL 103-325 
1994, PL 103-354 
Disaster Relief Act: 
Created permanent relief fund; authorized federal funding for repair 
of local government facilities 
Authorized federal emergency housing 
Permitted donation of federal surplus property such as cots, 
Amendment to 1950 law: 
Amendment to 1950 law: 
hardware, lumber, and plumbing supplies to state and local 
governments for distribution to individuals 
Amendment to 1950 law: 
Extended federal assistance eligibility to state facilities in addition to 
Guam, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands 
Disaster Relief Act: 
Extended federal assistance eligibility to rural communities, 
Federal funding for damage to higher-education facilities 
Affirmed authority of Office of Emergency Preparedness to 
Special loan provisions 
Provided for federally subsidized insurance along with federal 
Permitted sale of policies by private-insurance agents 
Funding for debris removal from private property 
Distribution of  food coupons 
Unemployment benefits for disaster victims 
Temporary housing for disaster victims 
SBA, FHA, VA  loan revisions 
Codified existing disaster legislation and added the following: 
unincorporated towns, and villages 
coordinate all federal disaster relief programs 
National Flood Insurance Act: 
reinsurance provisions 
Disaster Relief Act (limited to 15 months): 
Disaster Assistance Act: 
Grants to individuals for temporary housing/relocation 
Funding for legal services 
Community payments for tax loss 
Disaster Relief Amendment: 
Distinguished emergencies from major disasters 
Emphasized disaster-mitigation programs 
Made all commercial crops part ofthe program 
Introduced premium subsidy 
Permitted private-insurance companies to sell federal crop insurance 
Constituted principal federal authority for providing disaster relief 
Federal Crop Insurance Act: 
Stafford Act: 
(expansion of original 1950 authorization) 
NFIP Reform Act: 
Tightened flood-insurance purchase requirements 
Expanded mitigation incentives 
Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act: 
Offered catastrophic coverage for a $50.00 administrative fee per 
Provided additional coverage at subsidized rates 
crop, per county 
Source: Adapted from Office of  Emergency Preparedness (1972, vol.  I, table 1) and May (1985, 
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The trend of  growing federal involvement accelerated  further  during the 
early  1970s. In  a presidential message on disaster assistance in April  1970, 
Richard Nixon announced: “As we move into a new decade, one of the nation’s 
major goals is to restore a ravaged environment. But we must also be ready to 
respond effectively when nature gets out of control and victimizes our citizens” 
(“Message from the President” 1970,6).  The country had experienced twenty- 
nine major disasters in  1969, requiring an allocation of roughly $150 million 
from the President’s Disaster Relief Fund. It was the largest appropriation for 
disaster relief since the enactment of PL 81-875 nineteen years earlier (“Mes- 
sage from the President” 1970, 1). 
Responding to the devastation of Hurricane Camille and other catastrophes 
of 1969, Congress passed the 1970 Disaster Relief Act (PL 91-606). This legis- 
lation aimed to establish a permanent and comprehensive program of federal 
assistance, one that covered both private and public losses. Through the 1960s, 
federal disaster relief had gradually expanded to include funding for the repair 
of damaged higher-education facilities, debris removal from private property, 
and unemployment compensation and food coupons for hard-pressed disaster 
victims. The federal government had also increased the availability of SBA 
and FmHA disaster loans. The 1970 act not only codified this diverse disaster 
legislation but also charted new territory. Strongly emphasizing relief for indi- 
vidual victims, it mandated grants for temporary housing and legal services. 
Authorization for the permanent repair of public facilities (as opposed to the 
earlier restriction to temporary repair) and a focus on hazard mitigation consti- 
tuted other key features of the act. An amendment that followed in 1974 estab- 
lished a two-tiered system distinguishing  emergencies from major disasters 
and stepped up incentives for disaster-mitigation efforts. It expanded the presi- 
dent’s authority to provide immediate relief and enlarged the category of public 
facilities eligible for repair and restoration. The 1974 amendment also made 
available a wider range of assistance for states and  individual^.'^ 
By the mid- 1970s, federal disaster legislation provided an overall structure 
for public  and  private  assistance.  It  did  not,  however, mandate  a  detailed 
agenda for response. Issues such as the division of responsibility among fed- 
eral, state, and local authorities, or even among agencies within the federal 
government, remained open-ended and loosely organized. Successive adminis- 
trations therefore focused on streamlining relief efforts as well as on imple- 
menting mechanisms for cost containment. In  1978, President Carter estab- 
lished the Federal  Emergency Management Agency  (FEMA) to coordinate 
disaster programs distributed across a host of government agencies, including 
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Housing and Urban 
Development.  l6 
15. On legislative developments through 1974, see Office of  Emergency Preparedness (1972) 
and  Kunreuther (1973) as well as the  key  federal acts: PL 81-875 (1950), PL 89-769 (1966), 
PL 91-79 (1969), PL91-606 (1970), and PL93-288 (1974). 
16. On the origins of FEMA, see Federal Disaster Assisrance (1995, 94-97). 318  David A. Moss 
Table 8.2  Federal Dollars Obligated for Disaster Assistance, Fiscal Years 1977-93 
(in millions of constant 1993 dollars) 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Component 
Number of 































































































































Source: Federal Disaster Assistance (1995, table 1. I, p. 5). 
Note; Table excludes civil defense  preparedness expenditures  and federal disaster-insurance-program 
costs, except for flood-hazard-mapping activities of the NFIP. Complete fiscal year  1977-93  obligation 
data were not available for every disaster-related program/activity. 
"Number includes both major disasters and emergencies. 
Totals may not add because of rounding. 
From 1977 to 1993, federal disaster spending varied from year to year but 
averaged about $7 billion in constant 1993 dollars (see table 8.2). Although 
disaster relief looked very much like an entitlement, it did not technically qual- 
ify as one. Unlike mandated AFDC or Medicaid programs, federal disaster as- 
sistance depended almost entirely on discretionary year-to-year and emergency 
congressional appropriations (see table 8.3). 
8.2.4  Federal Flood and Crop Insurance 
As the federal role in disaster relief expanded in the 1960s and  1970s, so 
did interest in federal disaster insurance, specifically against flood and crop 
damage. Policymakers emphasized the self-financing nature of such programs 
and their potential to curb expensive supplemental relief allocations each time 
a disaster struck. Flood insurance was of particular interest since most private 
insurers excluded flood damage from their general property and casualty poli- 
cies. Knowing that individual flood risks in a given geographic area were often 
highly correlated, insurers feared that catastrophic flooding could wipe them 319  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
Current  Constant 1993 
Fiscal Year  Dollars  Dollars 
Current  Constant 1993 














































































out. William G.  Hoyt and Walter B. Langbein wrote in 1955 that floods “are 
almost the only natural hazard not now insurable by  the home- or factory- 
owner, for the simple reason that the experience of private capital with flood 
insurance has been decidedly unhappy” (p. 104). 
Reformers argued that a federally backed insurance program would succeed 
where private insurers had failed by spreading flood risks nationwide and pro- 
viding the necessary financial reserves. It would also strike a better balance 
between the need for federal assistance in large-scale disasters and private re- 
sponsibility. As disaster experts Douglas Dacy and Howard Kunreuther re- 
marked in the late  1960s when Congress was debating this issue, “It is our 
hope that the flood insurance bill before Congress will be swiftly passed and 
eventually extended to cover other natural hazards, enabling the federal gov- 
ernment to withdraw from its paternalistic role in relation to the private sector” 
(1969,235). 
The National Flood Insurance Act of  1968 (PL 90-448) offered coverage for 
residential and business properties. It particularly emphasized preventive ef- 
forts such as zoning regulations and building codes in order to minimize poten- 
tial flood damage. For the most part, premiums corresponded to actual risk. 
Exceptions were made for structures erected before an area’s identification as 
a flood zone, in which case subsidized rates applied. Over the years, the Na- 
tional Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) successfully encouraged better flood 
protection. But it did not entirely meet the goals of its original proponents. The 
program suffered from low subscription-except  among those at highest risk. 
Because there were few mechanisms to require homeowners in floodplains to 320  David A. Moss 
purchase insurance, many chose to remain uninsured and simply hope for the 
best. According to Benenson (1993,1861), as few as one in five mortgagehold- 
ers in flood-zone areas participated in the NFIP. 
Repetitive-loss cases for buildings erected before the cutoff date of  1974 
presented  another serious problem. As long as damage from a single flood 
never exceeded 50 percent of the property’s value, owners qualified for subsi- 
dized insurance. Such a provision allowed the Rulos family in Grafton, Illinois, 
to file four flood-insurance claims after buying a home in 1978. According to 
the Senate Task Force Report, repetitive-loss cases as of  1993 amounted to 2 
percent “of  the properties covered by flood insurance policies but accounted 
for 53 percent of the claims paid and about 47 percent of the dollars paid from 
the Flood Insurance Fund” (Federal Disaster Assistance 1995,63).” 
Federal crop insurance marked another significant attempt by lawmakers to 
take up the slack of private-insurance companies as well as to reduce the effect 
of  natural disasters on the nation’s farm economy. After a number of  private 
companies failed trying to provide multiperil crop insurance during the first 
two decades of the twentieth century, Congress began to show interest in spon- 
soring a federal initiative. The idea came and went until the mid-l930s, when 
severe droughts transformed public crop insurance into a potent political issue. 
At President Roosevelt’s initiative, federal crop insurance was finally enacted 
in  1938 under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Part of a larger agricultural 
stabilization plan, the insurance program initially proved quite limited, cov- 
ering only selected crops in selected counties. Over the years, however, Con- 
gress broadened the crop-insurance program and also supplemented it with 
substantial  ad  hoc  farm-disaster payments. These  ad  hoc payments, which 
seemed to reward the uninsured, came under increasing fire in the 1970s. 
Like the earlier flood-insurance legislation, the Federal Crop Insurance Act 
of 1980 (PL 96-365) attempted to eliminate ad hoc disaster payments by  stress- 
ing coverage under a public-insurance program. To encourage higher levels of 
participation, the 1980 act introduced a premium subsidy as well as coverage 
for all commercial crops in all agricultural counties. But these changes did not 
have the desired results. After  1980, fewer than half of eligible farmers pur- 
chased crop insurance. Since generous ad hoc payments continued to be made 
to the uninsured in the aftermath of disasters, many farmers must have rea- 
soned that even a subsidized insurance policy made little sense for them. As a 
result, the crop-insurance program was plagued by low participation and high 
costs. In 1993, farmers’ premiums ($563 million) covered only 30 percent of 
total program costs (i.e., indemnities of $1.5 14 billion plus administrative costs 
of $355 million). The difference constituted a large federal subsidy to farmers. 
(See tables 8.4 and 8.5.)18 
17. “On the Disaster Dole” (1993) cites slightly different figures. It states that, although “repeti- 
tive loss cases” amount to only 3 percent of all claims, “they account for more than a third of 
all payments.” 
18. For details on federal crop and flood insurance, see Federal  Disaster Assistance (1995, 
13-15,  112-15,  118-20).  On crop insurance, see also Goodwin and Smith (1995, esp. chap. 3). 321  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
Table 8.4  National Flood Insurance Program Income and Costs, Fiscal Years 
1977-93  (in millions of constant 1993 dollars) 
Insurance Program Expenses 
Loss and Loss  Administrative  Government 
Total 













































































































Source: Federal Disaster Assistance (1995, table 1.8, p.  13). 
"Total income includes premiums, investment income, other income, and federal policy fees. 
bIncludes underwriting expense, interest expense, and adjustments and deferrals. 
'Includes salaries and expenses and floodplain-management expenses. 
dFigures represent appropriations for NFIP expenses. For fiscal years 1977-86,  government costs 
consisted of administrative expenses and repayments of past loans from the Treasury. Beginning 
in fiscal year  1986, the NFIP has been required to pay all program' and administrative expenses 
from the insurance fund. 
8.3  Disaster Policy in Perspective: The Transformation of Public Risk 
Management in the United States since 1960 
As should be clear from the brief history just offered, federal disaster policy 
represents an intricate patchwork of disparate programs and commitments. The 
first major piece was the Disaster  Relief Act of  1950, which committed the 
federal government to a permanent role in disaster assistance. The patchwork 
grew most rapidly, however, during the late 1960s and early 1970s as program 
after program was added and expanded. This was the time when the federal 
government extended its standard coverage to include not only public casual- 
ties of disasters (such as schools, town halls, and so on) but private businesses 
and individuals as well. To cite just one example of the change, the number of 
subsidized home loans provided by the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
to disaster victims rose from only 11 in 1953 to 1,540 in 1963 to a peak of 
195,762  in 1973 (data courtesy SBA). The average size of an individual disas- 322  David A. Moss 
Table 8.5  Crop-Insurance  Program Income and Costs, Fiscal Years 1977-93 
(in millions of constant 1993 dollars) 
Premium Paid By:  Total 
Fiscal Year  Farmer  Government  Indemnities'  Lossesb  cost  costc 
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Source: Federal Disaster Assistance (1995, table 1.9, p. 14). 
"Indemnities are the costs of payments to farmers for crop losses. 
bExcess  losses are indemnities minus total premiums (figures may not add because of rounding). 
Total of  premiums paid by the government, excess losses, and administrative costs (figures may not add 
because of rounding). 
ter loan (in constant dollars) remained remarkably stable from the 1950s to the 
1990s. What increased-and  increased dramatically-beginning  in the late 
1960s was the number of citizens covered by  such federal disaster policies as 
the SBA loan program (see figure 8.1). 
In fact, the dramatic expansion of federal disaster relief after 1960 was part 
of a broader transformation of risk-management policy in the United States. 
As I have argued elsewhere (see Moss 1996, 1998),  the state and federal gov- 
ernments had  always engaged in  various  forms of  risk management. Until 
about  1900,  most  risk-management  policies  provided  security  for  busi- 
nesspeople against risks that were thought to discourage investment and trade. 
Limited liability for corporate shareholders and bankruptcy law  are two no- 
table examples of what I have labeled Phase I  risk-management policies. Be- 
ginning mainly after 1900, a new set of risk-management policies emerged, 
offering security to the American worker against a variety of  industrial haz- 
ards, including on-the-job accidents, unemployment, and loss of income in old 
age. Social insurance legislation and countercyclic fiscal policy stand out as 
the primary policy innovations of Phase ZZ. Phase 111 commenced around 1960 323  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of  Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
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0  Home  I  Business 
Fig. 8.1  Historical profile of SBA disaster loans: A,  Number of SBA disaster 
loans; B, Total value of SBA disaster loans (in millions of constant 1987 dollars); 
C, Average size of SBA loans (in constant 1987 dollars) 
Source: David Moss and Julie Rosenbaum, “The Great Mississippi Flood of  1993,” case no. 797- 
097. Boston: Harvard Business School, 1997. Copyright 0  1997 by The President and Fellows of 
Harvard College. Reprinted by permission. Data courtesy the Small Business Administration. 
and involved an extension of risk-management policy to protect not only busi- 
ness and labor but also citizens more generally. The expansion of federal disas- 
ter relief after 1960 represents one of the many changes associated with Phase 
111.  Some of the others include a transformation of product-liability law, the 
rapid growth of consumer protection and environmental regulation, and an ex- 
plosion of federal financial guarantees (see table 8.6). Table 8.6  The Three Phases of Risk-Management Policy in the United States 
Phase I: Creating a Secure Environment 
for Business  for Workers  for All Citizens 
Phase 11: Creating a Secure Environment  Phase 111: Creating a Secure Environment 
Period 1,  Property rights 
prior to 1900  Common internal currency 
Deposit insurance (state legislation) 
Limited liability 
Bankruptcy law 
Fixed exchange rate 
Deposit insurance (federal legislation)b 
Foreign-investment insurance 
Period 2, 
1900-1 960  Crop insuranceb 
Period 3,  Company bailouts 
since 1960  Country bailouts 
Workplace safety regulation 
Workers’ compensation 
Old age insurance 
Unemployment insurance 
Macroeconomic stabilization policyb 
Disability insurance 
Occupational safety and health regulation 
Pension regulation and insurance 
National defensea 
Local poor relieQ 
Product-safety laws (esp. foods and drugs) 
Federally insured mortgages (FHA and VA) 
Dramatic expansion of: 
Federal disaster reliefb 
Health, safety, and environmental protection 
Federal insuranceb 
Other federal financial guaranteesb 
Means-tested “welfare” programsa 
Liability law 
~~ 
Source: Moss (1996, exhibit 1). 
‘Status as a “risk-management” policy uncertain. 
bMay fit into more than one phase. 325  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of  Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
The transitions from Phase I to Phase I1 to Phase I11 were, in my view, pri- 
marily a consequence of the rapid rise in income that industrialization gener- 
ated. The primary objectives of Phase I risk-management policies were height- 
ened economic activity and resource mobilization, two important sources of 
economic growth. Once national income had increased sufficiently, however, 
the goal of economic security-at  first just for workers but ultimately for ev- 
eryone-began  to rival economic growth as a dominant social objective. That 
is, rising incomes induced a relative change in social priorities, which in turn 
drove the transformation of risk-management policy (Moss 1996). 
A broad consideration of public risk management and its historical evolution 
in the United States helps explain not only why the federal government became 
so deeply involved in disaster relief but also why it did so in particular during 
the second half of the twentieth century. One part of the explanation has to do 
with the nature of disaster risk. While the,public sector has historically man- 
aged many different types of  risk, those that threaten victims with financial 
devastation have always proved especially attractive to lawmakers. Indeed, the 
vast majority of  risk-management policies address relatively low-probability, 
high-consequence events. A short list of such policies includes limited liabil- 
ity for corporations, bankruptcy discharge, workers’ compensation, unemploy- 
ment insurance, deposit insurance, and pension insurance. Of course, disaster 
policy also addresses the threat of low-probability, high-consequence events. 
Howard Kunreuther (1993) has suggested that private markets deal poorly with 
such risks (see also Camerer and Kunreuther 1989). It may be that this mar- 
ket weakness accounts, at least in part, for policymakers’ notable interest in 
them-and  in disaster relief in particular. 
A second part of the explanation for the federal government’s increased role 
in disaster relief relates to the nature and pressures of Phase 111. The enactment 
of new risk-management policies, and the expansion of existing ones, acceler- 
ated sharply after 1960. Between 1966 and  1980, Congress enacted a broad 
array of health, safety, and environmental 1egi~lation.I~  Over the same years, 
the maximum insured bank deposit under federal deposit insurance was in- 
creased tenfold, from $10,000 to $100,000 (U.S. Department of the Treasury 
1991, table 2).  In 1968, the same year that federal flood insurance was estab- 
lished, Congress also created  federal crime insurance (ostensibly for areas 
19. Some of the highlights include the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 
which created the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA); the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969; President Nixon’s 1970 Executive Order creating the Environ- 
mental Protection Agency (EPA); the Occupational Safety and Health Act of  1970, which estab- 
lished the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); the Clean Air Act of  1970; 
the Clean Water Act of  1972; the Consumer Product Safety Act of  1972, which established the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission; and, several years later, the Comprehensive Emergency 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, which has come to be known as 
Superfund. Between  1960 and 1980, the number of pages in the Federal Register-a  favorite 
index of the regulatory explosion publicized by critics-increased  more than fivefold, from 14,479 
to 87,012 pages. On the increase in pages, see Koepp (1987,50). 326  David A. Moss 
inadequately served by private carriers) and federal riot reinsurance (Greene 
1976, 1979; Federal Disaster Assistance  1995, 112-21). The following year, 
Congress set up the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which 
offered  political  risk  insurance  to  American  businesses  investing  abroad 
(Robin 1984, 936-37).  The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which in- 
sured workers against pension-fund failures, was established in 1974; and be- 
tween 1970 and 1973 most states created insurance-guaranty funds to protect 
property and casualty policyholders against insurance-company insolvencies. 
Meanwhile, total public spending on social welfare in the United States surged, 
jumping from 11.5 percent of GDP in 1965 to 19.1 percent of GDP ten years 
later. The share of public social welfare spending in national income has re- 
mained roughly stable since then (Bixby  1993, esp. table 2, p. 74).20  Many 
other examples could be provided, ranging from the transformation of product- 
liability law during the 1960s and early 1970s to the establishment of Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Sallie Mae over roughly the same period (see Moss 
1996, esp. 36-70). 
The critical point here is that the rush of new risk-management policies af- 
ter  1960 reflected a fundamental shift in public expectations about the role 
of government. Americans increasingly expected protection against an ever- 
widening array of  hazards and, at the same time, were becoming more and 
more comfortable with federal insurance and other forms of public risk man- 
agement. 
What was distinctive about Phase I11 from the policymakers’ standpoint was 
that security for the individual had become an end in itself-an  apparent con- 
sequence of the nation’s extraordinary postwar affluence.*’  During Phase I, pol- 
icies that protected businesspeople  against adverse risks no doubt advanced 
the  security of  some individuals.  Bankruptcy-discharge  provisions, for ex- 
ample, were often justified  in the nineteenth century  as relief measures for 
overextended debtors. But the primary purpose of these policies was to encour- 
age those receiving protection to engage in trade and investment and thus to 
advance economic growth for the whole society. Although security for the indi- 
vidual was certainly an important motivation for worker-protection policies 
during  Phase  11,  there  nonetheless  remained  a broader objective as well- 
namely, social stability. Particularly after the First World War and during the 
20. Total public spending on social welfare includes expenditures on social insurance (including 
Medicare), public aid (including Medicaid), other health and medical programs, veterans’ pro- 
grams, and housing as well as child nutrition and a number of other small categories. Social insur- 
ance and public aid, which experienced the most dramatic increases, accounted for 44 percent of 
the total in 1965 and over 56 percent of the total in  1975. 
21. Indeed, John Kenneth Galbraiths The AffIent Society appeared in 1958. In it, he articulated 
much of the logic that would define Phase 111.  With only a touch of hyperbole, he explained that 
“the notion, so sanctified by the conventional wisdom, that the modem concern for security is the 
reaction to the peculiar hazards of modem economic life could scarcely be more in error. Rather, 
it is the result of improving fortune-of  moving from a world where people had little to one where 
they had much more to protect” (Galbraith [ 19581 1984, 87). 327  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of  Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
Great Depression, many social reformers worried that worker insecurity threat- 
ened the very existence of democratic capitalism.2z  Only in Phase I11 did pro- 
tection of the individual against adverse risks become, by itself, a primary and 
sufficient justification  for far-reaching  security legislation  (see Moss  1996, 
esp. 72-74). 
The path of federal disaster policy over the last thirty to forty years is thus 
entirely consistent with broader developments associated with Phase 111. The 
takeoff period in federal disaster spending came in the late  1960s and early 
1970s, as Congress began for the first time to assume ongoing responsibility 
for assisting individual victims of natural disasters. In the absence of long-term 
public opinion polls on this subject, it is impossible to offer direct empirical 
evidence regarding changes in public expectations about the government’s  role 
in time of disaster. But it seems clear that public expectations increased enor- 
mously. As shown in figure 8.2, the federal government covered 6.2 percent of 
total damages after Hurricane and Flood Diane in 1955, 12.8 percent of dam- 
ages after the Pacific Northwest Floods of 1964, and 48.3 percent of damages 
after Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972.*)  Since then, it has been common for the 
federal government to cover roughly half of uninsured losses stemming from 
major disasters. 
The dramatic shift in public expectations is also evident in the politics of 
disaster relief. As we have seen, the massive bailout of  1993-which  would 
have been inconceivable forty years earlier-faced  almost no opposition what- 
soever when it was passed in the wake of a calamity.24  Americans had come to 
expect and demand public compensation for the victims of natural disasters 
just as they had come to expect and demand public compensation (or at least 
publicly mandated compensation) for a wide range of man-made hazards, from 
workplace accidents to pension-fund failures. Indeed, rising expectations drove 
the transformation of public risk management under Phase 111, which involved, 
among other things, a transformation of federal disaster policy after 1960. 
22. For example, the economist John R. Commons declared at a convention of  government 
officials in 1919, “[Ulnless the capitalistic system begins to take care of the security of the laborer, 
begins to make jobs as secure as investments, then there is a serious question, with the growing 
number of wage earners who have no capital of their own, whether that system can continue to 
exist” (see Commons 1919, p. 4, frame 818). 
23. In none of these disasters were privately insured losses as a fraction of total estimated losses 
very large. The ratio of privately insured to total losses was 0.6 percent in the case of Hurricane 
and Flood Diane in 1955, virtually zero in the case of the Pacific Northwest Floods of  1964, and 
4.9 percent in the case of Tropical Storm Agnes in 1972. These particular disasters were selected 
in part to allow a comparison of federal coverage across time for events in which private-insurance 
coverage was low (see Dacy and Kunreuther  1969, table 2-4, p. 46, and table 2-2, p. 35; Kun- 
reuther 1973, table 3, p. 16). 
24. In fact, public expectations regarding disaster relief have increased to such an extent that 
FEMA now feels compelled to instruct citizens that the federal government’s  responsibility in this 
area is not unlimited. In its Cirizenk Guide to Disaster Assisfaace (1993). e.g., the agency high- 
lights six common misconceptions about federal disaster policy. The first two misconceptions are 
that “the Federal government has total responsibility for disaster recovery” and that “the objective 
of Federal disaster assistance is to ‘fix everything”’ (see pp. 1-7). 328  David A. Moss 
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Fig. 8.2  Federal coverage of major natural disasters:  A, Coverage rates-ratio 
of disaster spending to total estimated damages (in percentages)-on  five major 
disasters, federal government and the Red  Cross; B, Federal spending on major 
natural disasters, millions of 1993 dollars (1973 and 1993 fiscal years, not 
calendar years) 
Source: David Moss and Julie Rosenbaum, “The Great Mississippi Flood of 1993,” case no. 797- 
097. Boston: Harvard Business School, 1997. Copyright 0  1997 by The President and Fellows of 
Harvard College. Reprinted by permission. 
Panel A: The 1927 data pertain to the Mississippi floods of  1927. For estimates of total dam- 
ages ($300 million), federal spending ($10 million), and Red Cross spending ($17.5 million), see 
Lohof (1968, 122, 185, 169). The 1955 data pertain to Hurricane and Flood Diane, and the 1964 
data pertain to the Pacific Northwest Floods. For estimates of total damages ($832 million, $462 
million), federal spending ($51.8 million, $59.4 million), and Red Cross spending ($18.3 million, 
$4.2 million), see Dacy and Kunreuther (1969, table 2-4, p. 46, and table 2-2, p. 35). The  1972 
data pertain to Tropical Storm Agnes. For estimates of total damages ($2 billion), federal spending 
($965 million), and Red Cross spending (1 percent of  damages), see Kunreuther (1973, table 3, 
p. 16) and May (1985, table 7.7, p. 149). The 1993 data pertain to the Mississippi floods of  that 
year. For estimates of total damages ($12 billion) and federal spending ($6.3 billion), see Facts on 
File (1993) and Emergency Supplemental Appropriarions (1993). Data on Red Cross spending 
courtesy of the American Red Cross. 
8.4  Federal Disaster Policy in Action: 
The Great Midwest Flood of 1993 
Once federal lawmakers committed themselves to meeting high public de- 
mands in the area of disaster relief, how exactly did they go about assisting the 
victims? As a rule, major catastrophes overwhelmed the annual budgets allo- 
cated to government agencies providing relief. In such cases, after declaring a 
federal disaster, the president made an official request for supplemental appro- 
priations (see table 8.3 above). In  1993, the record flooding in the Midwest 
triggered an enormous flow of funds (see table 8.7). Although numerous fed- 
eral agencies took part in the relief effort, FEMA oversaw much of  the opera- 
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Panel B: In estimating federal spending on all major disasters in 1927, it was assumed that the 
amount expended on the Mississippi floods that year accounted for the vast majority of all federal 
disaster spending. Estimates of total federal spending on major disasters for 1955 ($73.9 million) 
and 1964 ($180.8 million) are based on Dacy and Kunreuther (1969, table 2-1, p. 32). Estimates 
of total federal spending for fiscal year  1973 ($1,170.1 million) are based on Kunreuther (1973, 
table 2, p. 14). Estimates of total federal spending for 1993 are from Federal Disaster Assistance 
(1995, table 1 .l,  p. 5). GDP deflators were used to convert these nominal figures into 1993 dollars. 
Note: In estimating federal spending on individual disasters (panel A) and total federal spending 
on all major disasters (panel B) for 1955, 1964, 1972, and fiscal year  1973, only the subsized 
portion of  federal loans was included. It was  assumed that the approximate subsidy on loans 
equaled one-third of their face value. Naturally, the full value of federal grants was included in 
each calculation. There was no need to estimate the subsidized portion of federal loans in either 
1927 or 1993. Little if any of the federal spending in 1927 was devoted to loans, and by fiscal year 
1993 the federal government had changed its accounting system for disaster spending so as to 
include only the subsidized portion of federal loans. 
cepted applications for cash grants of up to $11,900 each from individuals and 
families without access to other disaster aid. It also provided temporary hous- 
ing assistance, unemployment compensation, food, legal services, and crisis 
counseling (see Federal Disaster Assistance 1995, 152-53). 
Housing grants, which  covered rent and minor repairs to flood-damaged 
homes, helped Shirley Bornman deal with her extensive property loss. Made 
homeless when waters rose to the roof of her house, she received from FEMA 
$240 per month, guaranteed for eighteen months or until she was better settled. 
Bornman relied as well on payments from her NFIP policy, administered by 
FEMA. She had paid roughly $400 per year to insure her house for $45,000 
and the contents for $12,000. Bornman, however, was not  typical of  most 
floodplain residents. Only about 11 percent of the Midwest flood victims had 
flood insurance, and claims payments from the NFIP totaled only $297.3 mil- 
lion (see Sheets 1993,67; Sharing the Challenge 1994, 27).25 
25. For 1993 participation rates, see Federal Disaster Assistance (1995, 160). Table 8.7  Federal Disaster Spending for the Midwest Flood of 1993 (millions of dollars) 
Budgetary Resources 
Resources Provided  Total Resources Available  Obligations by Fiscal Year 
in Emergency  Additional Assistance for 
Supplemental 1  This Disaster from Base 














































100  677.1 
0  6.3 
100  125.0 
0  42.0 
0  71.2 
100  301.5 
25  322.3 
33  92.7 



















Source; Data courtesy of the Office of Management and Budget. Also consulted: Agriculture Department, Commerce Department, HUD, Transportation Department, 
Army Corps of  Engineers, SBA, and FEMA. 
Troportion of “Total Resources Available” targeted at public-sector recipients. Estimated by author. 
bProportion of “Total Resources Available” targeted at private-sector recipients. Estimated by author. 
‘Amounts for the SBA refer to the face value of its disaster loans. The subsidy rate for 1993 SBA flood loans was estimated at approximately 20 percent of  face value. 331  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
Local communities also turned to the federal government. FEMA’s public 
assistance programs helped rebuild  infrastructure,  including  state and local 
government buildings, roads, and water-treatment plants. States and munici- 
palities were also eligible for debris removal and emergency-work funds as 
well as community disaster loans in the event of  substantial tax-base loss. 
Overall, public-sector relief accounted for one-quarter of federal spending on 
the 1993 flood (see table 8.7). 
In Des Moines, the municipal waterworks suffered $12 million in physical 
damages and restoration expenses as a result of the flooding. Through the Fire- 
man’s Fund insurance company, the waterworks had added an endorsement to 
its general policy to provide $10 million in flood coverage. This extra insur- 
ance, which was not available for residential properties, had cost $2,000 per 
year.  It proved critical that summer in restoring the plant. For expenses not 
covered by the insurance policy-such  as the cost of sandbagging the levee 
and rent for temporary office space-the  waterworks relied on FEMA’s cost- 
sharing program for local governments. Although the standard cost-sharing ar- 
rangement obliged states to pick up 10 percent and local communities 15 per- 
cent of the cost of rebuilding public facilities, President Clinton waived these 
requirements in 1993, insisting on a combined state and local contribution of 
only 10 percent. In the case of the Des Moines waterworks, the state of Iowa 
picked up the entire 10 percent not covered by the federal government. With 
nearly all the direct property damage and restoration expenses covered through 
a combination of  public and private sources, the only significant cost to the 
waterworks was $2 million in lost revenue.26 
Another large chunk of federal disaster aid in 1993  went to farmers in the form 
of Department of Agriculture crop payments, FmHA loans, and Soil Conserva- 
tion Service grants. Initial estimates set agricultural damage from  direct flooding 
at over $2.5 billion, but, in the end, agricultural damage probably ran consider- 
ably higher than that. Those farmers with federally subsidized crop insurance 
qualified for compensation once their losses exceeded 35 percent of expected 
production. Those without insurance, however, collected almost as easily, qual- 
ifying for aid when losses were greater than 40 percent (Sharing the Challenge 
1994, 16, 22; Emergency Supplemental Appropriations  1993, 1697). Techni- 
cally, a farmer could combine a price-support payment, a crop-disaster pay- 
ment, and a crop-insurance payment to recoup as much as 90 percent of the 
value of  his crops (Freivogel 1993; Sheets 1993, 67). Congress’s emergency 
appropriation allocated almost $2.5 billion to the Commodity Credit Corpora- 
26. Telephone interview with Tamera Mason, Des Moines Water Works, May  1996. On  cost- 
sharing arrangements between federal, state, and  municipal  governments, see  “More Aid Ar- 
ranged” (1993, A10). Once again, after the  Northridge Earthquake of 1994, President Clinton 
increased the federal share for rebuilding state and local facilities from the standard 75 percent to 
90 percent. Even that  increase left California governor Pete Wilson disappointed since Wilson 
wanted the federal government to fund  100 percent of public reconstruction efforts (see Reeves 
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tion to relieve stricken farmers. Because ruined land from sand and debris 
compounded crop loss, Congress also appropriated $400 million to the Soil 
Conservation Service for soil repair. Ultimately, over half of all federal disaster 
spending on the 1993 flood covered agricultural losses (see table 8.7). 
Tom Waters was one of the many  farmers hit hard by  the Midwest Flood 
of  1993, which stormed through the network of levees that usually protected 
his farmland near the river. That year he had planted twelve hundred acres of 
corn, soybeans, and wheat. By the end of the flood, only nine acres remained 
above water. Not only did Waters lose his crop, but sand deposits and holes filled 
his fields. Because federal all-peril crop insurance for floodplain farms was 
very expensive, Waters had opted against it. He was eligible for federal crop- 
disaster payments, however, which covered over three-fourths of the approxi- 
mately $35,000 in material expenses that he incurred planting his 1993 crops. 
(In a typical year, he would have  received roughly $80,000 after harvesting 
and selling them.) For help with his damaged fields, Waters turned to the Soil 
Conservation Service’s cost-sharing program. The agency awarded just over 
$17,500, which covered 64 percent of  the cost to remove debris, plow under 
sand, and level farmland. The remaining 36 percent Waters had to provide out 
of his own  saving^.^' 
The Small Business Administration’s (SBA) loan program for both individu- 
als and businesses constituted yet another important component of federal di- 
saster relief. To ease the effect of flood loss, businesses small and large could 
apply for two types of  disaster loans: one covered property damage and the 
other economic injury resulting from lost profits. In the wake of the flooding, 
Congress raised the disaster-loan limit from $500,000 to $1.5 million. By  15 
November, seventy-five businesses had been approved for loans over $500,000 
(Small Business Administration  Disaster Assistance  1994, 7). Although the 
SBA charged a 4 percent interest rate in most cases, companies with substan- 
tial liquid assets or other available credit paid 8 percent. Individuals, too, were 
entitled to SBA loans for help in repairing damaged homes and recovering 
property. Like businesses, they simply needed to show ability to repay. The 
cost to the government of these subsidized interest rates was substantial-per- 
haps as much as one-third the face value of the loans (see, e.g., Budget ofthe 
United States Government 1996,927). 
One recipient of an SBA disaster loan in 1993 was Jeff Weber of Iowa, who 
lost both his home and his business to floodwaters. Inundation was so severe 
that for almost fifteen days he had to travel six-tenths of a mile by boat to reach 
the structures. Weber owned and ran a small business rebuilding automobile 
parts. Because of the number of waterways and the network of dams and levees 
in the region, government floodplain agencies had considered the area a low- 
risk zone for flooding. Relying on that information, Weber had not seen it nec- 
essary to take out flood insurance on the business. To  satisfy the mortgage 
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company when he bought his home, however, he had been required to purchase 
minimal flood insurance on that structure. This ultimately  covered about 50 
percent of the damage to his home. To stretch the insurance dollars, Weber had 
done almost all the rebuilding on his own. Like other individuals in the region, 
he also relied on help from private charitable organizations. While these organ- 
izations did not provide actual funds, their volunteers offered moral support 
and badly needed manpower to clean away the layers of sludge and dirt depos- 
ited by churning floodwaters. FEMA entered the scene early on to make pre- 
liminary damage estimates. Determining that Weber was not eligible for grant- 
in-aid  programs,  FEMA  officials  passed  his  file  onto  the  Small  Business 
Administration for a disaster loan. He qualified for both a home and a business 
loan. Concerned about going into debt, he took only a small loan for the house 
to cover approximately  10 percent of the damage; but he accepted a much 
larger one for his business. The SBA loaned the money in installments and 
required receipts to ensure that payments were spent in accordance with the 
loan terms. Because of serious structural damage, Weber ended up erecting a 
new building to house his office. Again, he did most of  the work himself to 
avoid heavy labor costs. He subsequently took out flood-insurance policies on 
both his business and his home.** 
On top of SBA loans, allocations for levee repair, health and environmental 
hazards, and highway and rail reconstruction rounded out federal relief expen- 
ditures. In  addition, the federal government  forwent revenue by  permitting 
disaster-related tax  write-offs-although  much  smaller ones than it had  al- 
lowed in the 1970s. Prior to 1982, individuals could deduct damaged property 
minus salvage value and insurance or other reimbursements. The tax-code revi- 
sion of  1982, however, instituted the  $lOO/lO-percent rule,  which  held that 
the only nonbusiness casualties qualifying for deductibility were unreimbursed 
losses exceeding $100 and  10 percent of  one’s adjusted gross income. The 
1982 rule meant  that a propertyowner with,  for example, an adjusted gross 
income of  $40,000 could deduct only $900 on an uninsured  loss of  $5,000 
(i.e., $5000 minus $100 minus 10 percent of $40,000). 
8.5  Federal Disaster Policy: Problems, Prospects, and Proposals 
8.5.1  Problems 
As should be clear from the discussion presented above, disaster policy rep- 
resents a sizable federal commitment-and  one that has begun to set off a few 
alarm bells in Washington. Just about everyone  agrees that disaster victims 
deserve some sort of public help in their time of need. But there is considerable 
disagreement over just how far the federal government should go. Soon after 
the Northridge Earthquake of early  1994, which  brought forth at least  $12 
28. Telephone interview with Jeff Weber (a pseudonym), December 1995. 334  David A. Moss 
billion in federal disaster expenditures (Critzer 1995), the U.S. Senate estab- 
lished a task force to study federal disaster policy. In a letter accompanying 
their final report, the task force’s cochairs, Senators John Glenn and Christo- 
pher Bond, suggested that the nation’s disaster policy, though serving an im- 
portant public purpose,  had finally begun to run up against real  budgetary 
constraints: “In creating this Task Force,  the  Senate found that  the policy 
underlying such federal disaster assistance was rooted in historical precedent 
and the American tradition of  helping friends and neighbors who have been 
plagued by these unfortunate tragedies. At the same time the Senate noted that 
the growing cost of  disaster assistance-six  major emergency supplemental 
appropriations Acts totaling over $17 billion since fiscal year 1988-must  be 
reconciled  with  the  current budgetary  restraints  imposed  on  discretionary 
spending and our budget reduction goals” (Federal  Disaster Assistance 1995, 
viQZ9  The senators might have mentioned that the amount that Congress appro- 
priated for relief and reconstruction in the aftermath of the Northridge Earth- 
quake just about equaled what the federal government spent annually on the 
AFDC program. Clearly, disaster relief had become a significant budget item. 
Looking forward, it appears that budget pressures stemming from federal 
disaster policy are likely to intensify in the future. There are two basic reasons 
for this. First, high public expectations about the federal government’s disaster 
responsibilities contribute to a powerful political dynamic in Congress while 
dampening personal  responsibility  among citizens. Second, growing uncer- 
tainty about the likelihood and potential costs of future natural disasters threat- 
ens to drive many private insurers away from catastrophe coverage, thus lea+ 
ing the federal government with a larger potential pool of uninsured losses 
to address. 
As this paper has attempted to demonstrate, public expectations about fed- 
eral disaster relief have strengthened considerably  since the  1960s. Indeed, 
public expectations are now so elevated that few politicians dare raise objec- 
tions to a massive appropriation  in  the aftermath of  a catastrophe. Disaster 
spending has become a political sacred cow. According to a survey conducted 
in  1995 for the Insurance Research Council, 87 percent of Americans either 
strongly approved (51 percent) or moderately  approved (36 percent) of  the 
federal  government  providing  disaster  relief  (Insurance  Research  Council 
1995, 63-67).  The political dynamic evident in Congress in the wake of the 
1993 flood demonstrated the power of these attitudes at a moment of crisis. 
Again and again in the aftermath of disasters, representatives from the affected 
states have insisted that their constituents deserve no less than what other vic- 
29. A subsequent passage in the same letter reads: “There is no question Americans traditionally, 
and selflessly, have given themselves, their time, and their support to help fellow citizens who have 
suffered as a result of these catastrophes. That indeed is a hallmark of this country. And we should 
expect-and  deserve-as  much from the federal government. But just as our response to disasters 
must be swift, it must also be cost-effective, especially in an age where federal dollars are increas- 
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tims received in the past and that the particular nature of their disaster might 
justify even more. Federal catastrophe coverage has thus been subject to a 
ratcheting-up process from disaster to disaster, whereby coverage rates occa- 
sionally increased (particularly in the late 1960s and early  1970s) and only 
very rarely declined (see fig. 8.2 above and fig. 8.3).30 
One important consequence of  all this is that the federal government now 
lacks credibility when it threatens to withhold relief ex post from those individ- 
uals who fail to follow certain rules or meet particular criteria ex ante. At the 
time of the 1993 flood, for example, many farmers in the affected area were 
upset about a federal rule that denied soil-repair grants to anyone involved in 
three or more disasters over the previous twenty-five years. They proceeded to 
petition their representatives for help. In the end, Congressman Harold Volk- 
mer (D-Missouri) persuaded the Agriculture Department to rescind the dis- 
qualification and make all farmers eligible. The failure of federal policymakers 
credibly to commit obviously generates a moral hazard problem. Citizens who 
feel confident that the government will pay are more likely to forgo insurance 
coverage and to live in more hazard-prone areas.3’ By increasing the level of 
uninsured disaster losses that the federal government will find itself politically 
bound to compensate in the future, the credible-commitment and moral hazard 
problems together form a vicious circle that ought to alarm federal policy- 
makers. 
Federal lawmakers also have  reason to worry  about new  disaster-related 
findings within the scientific community that could lead to dramatically in- 
creased federal expenditures in the years ahead. Traditionally, it had been as- 
sumed that disaster experience over the recent past constituted a reasonable 
basis for assessing the likelihood of disasters in the future. If a particular region 
experienced four major hurricanes over the previous twenty years, then the 
probability of  a major hurricane hitting the region in any future year was 
thought to be about one in five. But, according to Anthony H. hap,  director 
of the nonprofit Bermuda Biological Station for Research, “Assessing the his- 
torical frequency of natural catastrophes has certain inherent weaknesses. For 
example, the cycle of natural processes may be longer than the time period in 
30. In  1993, e.g., one representative from Illinois reminded his colleagues on the House floor 
what he had done to support the victims of other disasters in the past: “Let me also tell my col- 
leagues that when this gentleman was asked to come to the aid of California in their disaster, for 
the disaster in Florida and the disaster in Texas, I marched up that Hill to help American people 
in need. Today what we get are theories about how to pay for it” (Congressional Record 139 [22 
July 19931: HS005). Of course, disaster relief has always been subject to logrolling in Congress. 
In  1965, in an effort to assure disaster relief for his constituents, Senator Long remarked on the 
floor of the Senate, “[Als I have told the senator [Proxmire] privately, if his State should ever be 
visited with a similar disaster, he could count on my vote to help provide for his people” (quoted 
in May 1985,21). 
3  1. In fact, the most hazard-prone states (such as California, Florida, Hawaii, and Texas) have, 
for quite some time, experienced much faster population growth than has the nation as a whole. 
Florida, e.g.,  experienced a population growth rate of 43 percent between 1980 and 1994, as com- 
pared to only 15 percent nationally (see Dunleavy et al. 1996, 5). A  141  I 
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Fig. 8.3  Flood damage and federal relief: A,  Flood damages in the United 
States, 1927-94  (in millions of 1987 dollars); B, Federal flood relief subsidies as a 
fraction of total flood damages in the United States, 1949-73 
Sources: David Moss and Julie Rosenbaum, "The Great Mississippi Flood of  1993," case no. 
797-097. Boston: Harvard Business School, 1997. Copyright 0 1997 by The President and Fel- 
lows of Harvard College. Reprinted by permission. 
Flood-damage estimates for 1927-75  are from Climatological  Data 28, no.  13 (1977):  117. 
Flood-damage estimates for 1982-92 are from US.  Army Corps of Engineers, Annual Flood Dam- 
age Report to Congress for Fiscal  Year 1992 (1993, fig. 2, table 10); data for 1993 and 1994 are 
from US.  Army Corps of Engineers, Annual Flood Damage Report to Congress for Fiscal  Year 
1994 (1995, table 4). A GDP deflator was used to convert nominal dollars to  1987 dollars. Data 
on the subsidized portion of federal flood-relief spending for 1949-73  are from Abeles, Schwartz 
(1978, table 4, pp. 9-10). 
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which they were observed. In addition, the past record may be inaccurate be- 
cause of technical limitations at that time. Finally, human activity perturbs the 
global climate, perhaps changing the course of the cycles” (quoted in Banham 
1995, 27). Richard T. Gordon, an applied physicist and scientific consultant to 
Chubb, offers a similar warning: “Insurers are making huge assumptions that 
the past will be the key to the future. We have at hand about 110 years of re- 
corded observations of global climate activity. I can tell you with certainty that 
we have not seen the range of climate variation in that time. When you talk 
geologic time scales, 110 years just does not register. That means there are hum- 
canes out there that we have not seen in the past 110 years” (quoted in Ban- 
ham 1995,27). 
Although a clear consensus has yet to form within the scientific community, 
many researchers are now suggesting that natural catastrophes are likely to 
come more frequently and strike with greater intensity in the years ahead. Wil- 
liam Gray, a Colorado State University meteorologist, is predicting dramati- 
cally increased hurricane activity. Believing that we are now coming out of a 
twenty-year cycle of relative calm, Gray maintains, “Inevitably, long stretches 
of destruction will return. . . . Florida and the East Coast will see hurricane 
devastation as they have never experienced before” (quoted in Catalan0 1995, 
66; see also Cowen 1994). Meanwhile, several groups of seismologists have 
recently announced the existence of an “earthquake deficit” in California. Be- 
cause the Los Angeles basin experienced many fewer earthquakes over the past 
two hundred years than would have been expected on the basis of geological 
science, these seismologists are anticipating increased earthquake activity in 
the future (see “Grievous Faults” 1995; Monastersky 1995). Finally, the big- 
gest scientific question mark of all, global warming, threatens to generate more 
floods, droughts, and fires as well as humcanes and other windstorms over the 
very long term. Gerhard Berz, a meteorologist who runs the technical research 
division at Munich Re, offers an almost apocalyptic warning: “The increased 
intensity of all convective processes in the atmosphere will force up the fre- 
quency and severity of tropical cyclones, tornadoes, hailstorms, floods and 
storm surges in many parts of the world, with serious consequences for all 
types of property insurance” (quoted in Leggett 1993, 29h3* 
Naturally, such scientific predictions have enormous implications for private 
insurers. And, since the federal government tends to pick up a large portion of 
uninsured disaster losses, any change in insurance coverage necessarily has 
significant implications for federal policy as well. 
Before 1989, no natural disaster in the United States had ever caused more 
than $1 billion in insured losses. Hurricane Hugo shattered that record, increas- 
ing it by a factor of four. Even after Hugo, however, U.S. insurers tended to 
32. Many analysts also cite demographic shifts-namely, domestic migration into coastal states, 
which are generally more prone to disasters than inland states-as another factor that will contrib- 
ute to increased natural catastrophe losses in the years ahead (see, e.g., Dunleavy et al. 1996.4-5; 
Durham, Johnson, and Winston 1995.20). 338  David A. Moss 
assume that the worst possible windstorm would not cause damages to insured 
property in excess of $8 billion. Humcane Andrew, which struck on 24 August 
1992, transformed those expectations literally overnight. In the words of Phil- 
lip Longman, “This one storm alone blew  apart Florida’s private insurance 
market and even much of  its fail-safe regulatory apparatus” (1994, sec.  1). 
The most costly disaster in American history, Andrew inflicted $15.5 billion in 
insured losses, which was about 50 percent more than all the premiums col- 
lected for property coverage in Florida over the previous 22 years. Estimates 
vary,  but Andrew probably caused at least another $10 billion in uninsured 
losses (see Murphy 1995; Gastel 1996a; Longman 1994, sec. 1; Leggett 1993, 
28; Ferrara 1995). Less than a year and a half later, insurers were blindsided 
once again when the Northridge Earthquake in southern California generated 
claims totaling $12.5 billion-a  figure over three times larger than what the 
insurers had received in earthquake premiums over the previous twenty-five 
years (Quackenbush 1996; see also Gastel 1996b). 
The one-two punch of Andrew and Northridge forced insurers to reassess 
their exposure to catastrophes nationwide and to begin taking a closer look at 
the newly emerging scientific research on natural disasters. Says Richard Gor- 
don, “If in fact the past is not a good guide to what will happen in the future, 
the entire underwriting basis of what insurers are doing is flawed. That’s a scary 
thought when you think of the billions of dollars that are at stake” (quoted in 
Banham 1995,27). 
Indeed, growing doubts about their ability to predict future catastrophic 
events on the basis of past experience has frightened quite a number of insur- 
ers. Many property and casualty companies, including the two biggest provid- 
ers of homeowner’s insurance, Allstate and State Farm, began to control their 
exposure in states like Florida and California by sharply limiting new cover- 
age. Beginning in the fall of  1995, for example, State Farm  stopped writing 
any new policies at all in Florida and worked to limit its operations in Califor- 
nia and North and South Carolina as well as selected areas in Texas and Louisi- 
ana. In October 1996, Nationwide (the nation’s fifth largest home insurer) an- 
nounced a dramatic reduction of new  sales of homeowner’s insurance across 
the entire eastern seaboard and down through the Gulf of Mexico. Explaining 
the policy, which would affect sales from Maine to Texas, Nationwide’s presi- 
dent declared, “Prudence requires us to diligently manage our exposure to cata- 
strophic losses,” Said the chief financial officer, “Nationwide Insurance pos- 
sesses great financial strength-and  we intend to keep it that way” (quoted in 
Treaster 1996). 
The dramatic rise in disaster losses after 1989, along with mounting ques- 
tions about the validity of predicting the incidence and severity of natural ca- 
tastrophes on the basis of recent experience, had clearly shaken private insur- 
ers. Indeed, many simply decided to get out before it was too late. Reacting 
to Nationwide’s announcement in October 1996, Jack Weber of the insurance 
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will write policies in  coastal areas is becoming increasingly more difficult. 
And the trend appears to be accelerating” (quoted in Treaster 1996).33 
8.5.2  Prospects and Proposals 
Proposals for reform have emerged at both the state and the federal levels. 
For their part, legislators in the most disaster-prone states have attempted to 
assure an adequate supply of catastrophic insurance coverage for their citizens. 
In the immediate aftermath of Humcane Andrew, officials in Florida imposed 
a moratorium on insurance-policy nonrenewals and cancellations, thus frus- 
trating the plans of  most insurers to reduce coverage sharply in the state. In 
order to accommodate the demand for new policies, Florida lawmakers also 
established the Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Associa- 
tion (JUA), which became an insurer of last resort. On 30 June 1996, the JUA 
was servicing over 910,000 policies, making it the second largest property in- 
surer in the state. Florida’s insurance commissioner, Bill Nelson, insisted at 
that time that the state’s strategy for solving the insurance problem was “going 
in the right direction” but nonetheless acknowledged, “We’re in a crisis” (Na- 
varro 1996). Since Andrew, Florida homeowners had experienced a 72 percent 
increase in insurance premiums, and most property insurers were still trying 
to limit coverage in the state wherever possible (“American Insurance” 1993; 
Navarro 1996; Gastel 1996a; Longman 1994). 
A similar drama unfolded in California after the Northridge Earthquake of 
early 1994. The Northridge catastrophe convinced most insurers that providing 
earthquake coverage in California was simply too risky. Because of a state law 
requiring all home insurers to offer earthquake policies to their customers, 
many insurers felt compelled to get out of the homeowner’s market altogether. 
California’s insurance commissioner, Chuck Quackenbush, announced in 1995 
that the “entire insurance industry . . .  is engaged in a panic run for the border” 
(quoted in Keohe 1995).34 
In order to address the mounting insurance crisis, California officials ini- 
tially authorized the state’s FAIR (Fair Access to Insurance Requirements) Plan 
to offer residential property and earthquake insurance. Originally created to 
provide insurance in “underserved” areas, such as inner-city communities, the 
FAIR Plan was transformed after the Northridge Earthquake into a property 
insurer of  last resort, analogous to Florida’s JUA. Insurance  Commissioner 
Quackenbush, however, was uncomfortable with the idea of allowing the FAIR 
33. In a recent article, Jaffee and Russell (1997) attributed the reluctance of private insurers to 
cover natural catastrophe risk to their unwillingness “to hold large amounts of liquid capital.” This 
unwillingness, in  turn, is attributed to a variety of  “institutional factors,” including accounting 
requirements, taxes on reserves (retained earnings) as well as on the interest income that they 
generate, and the threat of  takeover that generally comes with large holdings of cash. 
34. In the fall of  1995, Quackenbush explained to lawmakers in Washington, “The threat of 
earthquakes has resulted in a virtual shutdown of the market for new homeowners insurance poli- 
cies. Companies representing 93 percent of  the market have either stopped or restricted the sale 
of  new homeowners policies” (quoted in Phinney 1996; see also Wood 1996,4). 340  David A. Moss 
Plan to become, by default, one of California’s largest insurers. Like the JUA 
in Florida, the FAIR Plan in California was funded in large measure on a post- 
assessment basis. In the event of a major catastrophe, losses in excess of pre- 
mium revenue would be imposed on the state’s private insurers according to 
their share of the residential market. As an alternative, Quackenbush advocated 
the creation of a specialized earthquake-insurance pool that would be funded 
primarily by  the state’s insurers. When he scaled back the FAIR plan to its 
original mission on  1 June  1996, many critics charged that he was  playing 
politics, trying to create a crisis in order to force the enactment of his proposals 
for a new state agency. Whatever Quackenbush’s true motivation, his decision 
certainly increased the pressure on lawmakers, and they quickly fell into line. 
At the beginning of September 1996, state lawmakers approved the estab- 
lishment of the California Earthquake Authority (CEA) and authorized it to sell 
earthquake policies. The legislation allows insurers willing to commit funds to 
the CEA to discontinue their own earthquake coverage. Commissioner Quack- 
enbush expects that, if necessary, the CEA would be able to cover even a major 
disaster through a combination of premiums and insurance-company contribu- 
tions. Individual claims would likely be less than they would be under tradi- 
tional earthquake coverage since CEA policies (known by some as “minipoli- 
cies”) have high, 15 percent deductibles and cover very little beyond structural 
damage to the home itself. Damage to pools,  driveways, patios,  and so on 
would no longer be covered. Most of the big insurance companies doing busi- 
ness in California supported the legislation because it would cap their liability. 
An analyst at Merrill Lynch, for example, estimated that the creation of  the 
CEA would limit Allstate’s earthquake exposure to $900 million. Of course, 
the state of California has implicitly accepted responsibility for losses that can- 
not be paid for out of both CEA premiums and the ex ante commitments of 
private insurers (Kersnar 1996; Scism 1996; Quackenbush 1996). 
In  addition  to  these  state  efforts,  three  distinct  reform  initiatives  have 
emerged at the federal level. One of  the three, and the only one on which 
Congress has already taken action, aims at increasing participation in the fed- 
eral government’s flood- and crop-insurance programs. Legislation enacted in 
1994 to reform the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) increased incen- 
tives for flood-mitigation efforts and tightened enforcement of flood-insurance 
requirements. Among other things, it prohibited federal disaster relief to per- 
sons living in flood-prone areas who had failed to maintain required insurance. 
It also established penalties for banks and other regulated lenders that extended 
loans  to borrowers  without  flood insurance.  The law changed  as well  the 
NFIP’s waiting period for new flood-insurance policies from five to thirty days. 
The old provision had allowed homeowners during the 1993 Midwest Flood 
to purchase insurance even when danger proved imminent.35  Congress also 
35. See Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 51 (30 October 1993): 2985; 51 (6 November 
1993): 3053; 51 (11 December 1993): 3371; and 52 (7 May  1994): 1130. See also the outline of 
PL 103-25 in United States Code Congressional and Administrative News 5 (1994): 2025-35. 341  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of  Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
sought to reduce the need for large emergency-disaster payments to farmers 
by  enforcing participation in the federal crop-insurance program. The 1994 
reform act required a minimum level of  participation while providing lower 
premium rates and better coverage to farmers. At the same time, it made enact- 
ment of future supplemental disaster appropriations by  Congress much more 
difficult. In addition to repealing the authorizing legislation for farm-disaster 
payments, the act restricted Congress’s ability to circumvent budget-control 
regulations by  designating farm-disaster appropriations as emergency spend- 
ing (Federal Disaster Assistance 1995, 14-15,  120-21).36 
A second approach to reform, originally advocated by the insurance indus- 
try’s Natural Disaster Coalition and considered by  Congress in 1995, would 
have established a national equivalent to the California Earthquake Authority. 
The new private entity, to be known as the Natural Disaster Insurance Corpora- 
tion (NDIC), would be financed and administered by  a consortium of private 
insurance companies. The NDIC would sell disaster coverage through these 
private insurers and would bear all the associated risk. Much like the CEA, the 
NDIC would effectively cap the disaster liability of  private insurers. In the 
event  of  a  major  catastrophe or  series of  catastrophes that  exhausted the 
NDlC’s available resources, the NDIC would (under the original proposal) be 
authorized to borrow from the U.S. Treasury. Unlike the law that established 
the CEA, however, the proposed NDIC legislation would require all homeown- 
ers with federally assisted mortgages and living in earthquake- and hurricane- 
prone regions to purchase a minimum level of  catastrophic coverage. Cur- 
rently, over 90 percent of  homeowners have  mortgages that are in one way 
or another federally assisted (see Phinney 1996; Emerson and Stevens 1995; 
Lochhead 1995). 
A third reform initiative at the federal level, put forth by the Clinton admin- 
istration, aims to strengthen and expand the catastrophe reinsurance market by 
having the U.S. Treasury sell disaster-contingent claims on the open market. 
These contracts would pay off in the event of natural disasters causing at least 
$25 billion in insured damages. Once the $25 billion trigger was reached, each 
contract would pay $1 million for every additional billion dollars in damages, 
up to a maximum of  $25 million. Presumably, insurers and reinsurers would 
buy these contracts to cover their exposure in the event of  a megacatastrophe 
like Andrew or Northridge. Administration officials insisted that the contracts 
36. Many farmers became aware of  the full significance of  these changes only after another 
Midwest flood struck in  1995. The 1994 legislation compelled the farmer Tom Waters to pay an 
annual registration fee amounting to a few hundred dollars for the minimum required level of crop 
insurance. Although the 1995 flood took about half his corn acreage, he received no federal disaster 
payments that year-a  notable departure from previous years. Nor did he receive any crop insur- 
ance since his overall yield remained just above the level that would have triggered benefits. While 
in  theory he could have purchased additional crop insurance from the federal government (i.e., 
beyond the minimum level required), he had chosen not to do so because he regarded the premiums 
as exorbitant. In fact, Waters insisted that the legislative change of  1994 had constituted a major 
step in the wrong direction. ‘‘I pay $200 [in compulsory registration fees] every year for basically 
no coverage,” he said. “It just makes me sick” (telephone interview with Tom Waters, May 1996). 342  David A. Moss 
would carry no federal  subsidy (see Brostoff  1996; Gastel  1996a; see also 
D’Arcy and France 1992). 
Unfortunately, all these initiatives, at both the state and the federal levels, 
are plagued by serious problems. The main interest of the state governments 
at this point is to assure the availability of  homeowner’s insurance, which is 
essential to the maintenance  of  healthy real estate markets. One approach, 
adopted by legislators in both Florida and California, has been for the states to 
provide insurance directly. But the simple fact is that each of the various states 
is poorly positioned to diversify catastrophic risks. In addition, each lacks the 
financial wherewithal to cover the losses stemming from a megacatastrophe, 
such as a $75 billion hurricane in Florida, a $70 billion earthquake in Los 
Angeles, or a $100 billion earthquake in the New Madrid region of the Mid- 
west. Even California’s Chuck Quackenbush acknowledges that, in the event 
of a megadisaster, federal support would be necessary (see Phinney 1996). 
On the federal level, Congress’s attempts in 1994 to increase participation 
in the government’s flood- and crop-insurance programs certainly represented 
steps in the right direction. But there remains a serious question about the 
credibility of the federal government’s threat to withhold assistance from vic- 
tims lacking federal insurance. The politics associated with disaster relief high- 
lighted earlier in this paper suggest that federal commitments are often aban- 
doned in the midst of major crises, when public sympathy for victims is high. 
The true test of the 1994 reforms will come only after the next major flood. 
The proposed Natural Disaster Insurance Corporation (NDIC) suffers from 
at least three significant flaws. First, any attempt to charge actuarially fair rates 
will likely mean prohibitively high rates in several regions of the country par- 
ticularly prone to disaster activity. The historical record suggests that the NDIC 
will face enormous pressure to cross-subsidize rather than charge prohibitively 
high rates in certain regions, such as southern California. From a public policy 
standpoint, however, it would seem that such cross-subsidization should prop- 
erly be left to lawmakers. Second, the NDIC will almost surely have to rely on 
federal financial support in the event of  a megacatastrophe. But, again, pru- 
dence would suggest that, if the federal government is going to back the NDIC 
and implicitly underwrite its activities, then the federal government ought to 
have substantial control over its operations. Third, the NDIC proposal suffers 
from a credible-commitment problem comparable to that facing the flood- and 
crop-insurance reforms enacted in 1994. According to the NDIC’s chief legis- 
lative sponsors,  “Those  who refuse  to buy  [insurance] coverage would no 
longer be eligible for federal assistance to rebuild their homes should a natural 
disaster strike” (Emerson and Stevens 1995). As we have seen, however, such 
a threat could well prove empty in the wake of a major disaster. 
When asked to review the NDIC proposal, policy analysts at the Congres- 
sional Budget Office (CBO) drafted a memo on 2 February  1996 warning in 
the strongest possible terms about the first two problems noted above. On the 
issue of rate setting, the CBO analysts observed that “the goal of pricing poli- 343  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
cies at rates that are both affordable and (as required in the bill) actuarially 
sound might be incompatible.” In fact, they questioned whether it was possible 
to identify actuarially sound rates at all, given the enormous uncertainties re- 
garding disaster forecasting. They also expressed a great deal of concern that 
the NDIC’s obligations would become contingent liabilities of the federal gov- 
ernment. “While we cannot estimate the exact budgetary impact of H.R. 1856,” 
the analysts wrote, “we are concerned that this bill could obligate the federal 
government to cover the costs of a major natural catastrophe. Tens of billions 
of  dollars of  insurance company liabilities could be shifted onto the federal 
government with highly uncertain prospects of repayment.” Although the fed- 
eral government would not be legally obligated to assume these liabilities, the 
memo noted, federal lawmakers would likely feel compelled to do so given the 
NDIC’s federal charter and obvious public purpose. Unlike Fannie Mae and 
other government-sponsored enterprises, however, the NDIC “would be com- 
pletely unregulated. That could require the federal government to assume re- 
sponsibility for the NDIC’s actions without the ability to regulate its rates and 
underwriting standards” (Congressional Budget Office 1996).37 
Finally, the Clinton administration’s recommendation that the Treasury De- 
partment offer disaster-contingent-claims contracts addresses only one part of 
the overall problem. The biggest advantage of the proposal is that it would 
allow insurers and reinsurers to hedge their bets on megacatastrophes. If, as 
has sometimes been argued, insurers and reinsurers are risk averse to high- 
consequence, low-probability events such as natural disasters, then the pro- 
posed contract would increase overall market efficiency by allowing the insur- 
ers and reinsurers to manage their extreme downside risk. Thus, to the extent 
that private markets for natural catastrophe risks are failing on account of risk 
aversion among insurers and reinsurers, the administration’s proposal repre- 
sents a valuable solution. 
There is, however, another important reason for the failure of  this market. 
The widespread perception that disaster activity is likely to increase and inten- 
sify in the years ahead has led insurers to demand catastrophe premiums- 
particularly in the most disaster-prone areas-that  both policyholders and reg- 
ulators view as prohibitive. If the high prices that insurers wish to charge are 
the result, not primarily of risk aversion on their part, but rather of their as- 
signing high probabilities to the likelihood of major disasters, then the admin- 
istration’s proposal would be of  little help.38  It may well be that insurers are 
exiting the market for natural catastrophe risks simply because they are unable, 
37. As a result of this  and  many  other  strong criticisms of  the  NDIC proposal, the  Natural 
Disaster Coalition withdrew  it in early  1996 and has  since put forth a number of  more modest 
reforms (see, eg,  Gettlin 1996, 8, 112). 
38. The  fact that  only a very  small volume of instruments similar to those proposed by the 
administration trade privately on the Chicago exchange represents further evidence that there may 
not be much of a market for nonsubsidized contracts of this kind. On disaster futures and options 
traded on the Chicago Board of Trade, see Zolkos (1996), Petch (1996). and “Disastrous Bonds” 
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for political reasons, to charge what they believe to be actuarially fair prices 
for these risks. Clearly, the introduction of disaster-contingent-claims  contracts 
would affect neither the actual likelihood of major catastrophes occurring nor 
the actuarially fair premium rate for catastrophe insurance. 
The broader problem is that many propertyowners living in disaster-prone 
areas would probably choose not to insure against catastrophe risks if  faced 
with actuarially fair premiums. State officials have  attempted to address this 
problem by  regulating prices and restricting the opportunities of  insurance 
companies to exit the market. But, even if regulators permitted actuarially fair 
premiums to be charged and the market were thus allowed to work, many 
people would end up without insurance because they would view the price as 
unaffordable. And the government, for its part, would remain liable for a large 
share of these uninsured catastrophe losses because of high public expectations 
about federal disaster coverage. The primary limitation of the administration’s 
proposal to introduce disaster-contingent-claims contracts, therefore, is that it 
fails to address the inherent conflict between actuarial fairness and the afford- 
ability of catastrophe premiums in disaster-prone areas. 
A secondary limitation concerns the issue of revenue neutrality, which the 
program’s proponents insist is both possible and necessary. Given that a natural 
disaster causing over $25 billion in insured damages has never occurred, it is 
difficult to believe that anything but the roughest or most fanciful of probabil- 
ity estimates could be assigned to the likelihood of  such a disaster actually 
striking. As a result, policymakers would probably come under intense politi- 
cal pressure to accept low-end risk estimates in setting the government’s reser- 
vation price in order to make the contracts more aff~rdable.~~ 
So long as it is understood that a government subsidy would likely be in- 
volved, the proposal to create disaster-contingent-claims contracts should be 
seen as a constructive reform initiative. By affording insurers and reinsurers a 
means of  protecting themselves against megacatastrophes, the proposed  fi- 
nancial instrument might encourage increased private coverage of natural di- 
saster losses. It would do this by addressing the inherent risk aversion of insur- 
ers and  reinsurers to  a particular set of  high-consequence, low-probability 
events. However, unless the subsidies were quite large, private insurers would 
probably continue to find it impossible to offer catastrophe premiums that were 
both actuarially fair and economically affordable in the most disaster-prone 
regions of the country. The proposed contracts obviously would not be very 
efficient vehicles for cross-subsidizing disaster risks. But, since the politics of 
disasters in the United States appear to demand a significant degree of cross- 
39. Congressional Budget Office (1996) suggests a similar critique: “While the Administration 
intends to price the contracts so that the net cost to the taxpayers over time is zero, CBO is uncer- 
tain whether it would be possible to establish a premium rate to an options contract that would 
have no present-value cost to the federal government. A triggering event must hit $25 billion before 
the contracts pay out; however, there has never been a catastrophe of that size, and it is extremely 
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subsidization, the administration’s proposal cannot be viewed as anything like 
a complete remedy. Indeed, the ideas developed in this paper would suggest 
that a more comprehensive reform is required. 
8.5.3  The French System of Catastrophe Coverage: 
A Model for the United States? 
Perhaps the most successful national disaster policy in  the industrialized 
world belongs to the French. Unlike the United States, which suffers many 
different types of natural catastrophes every year, France is plagued mainly by 
floods. But, much like their American counterparts, the French have come to 
expect a substantial state role in disaster relief. In fact, as early as 1946, the 
French Constitution established the principle of “solidarity and equality of all 
French towards the burden resulting from natural disasters.” The same clause 
was incorporated into the Constitution of  1958. Until  1982, private insurers 
in France offered precious little coverage of natural catastrophe risks, but the 
government typically provided ad hoc assistance in the aftermath of disasters. 
Although concerns mounted in the 1970s about the rising expense of public 
disaster relief, it was not until major floods struck southern France in late 1981 
that lawmakers were driven to overhaul the system and introduce a comprehen- 
sive natural disaster policy.4o 
The  1982 disaster  law  mandated  that  every  non-life-insurance  policy  in 
France include comprehensive disaster coverage along with a corresponding 
surcharge fixed as a percentage of the base premium. Except for automobile 
insurance, property and casualty insurance is not compulsory in France; but, 
since 1982, every policy sold has had to include legally specified disaster pro- 
visions. The surcharge was originally set at 5.5 percent but increased to 9 per- 
cent the following year. The 9 percent surcharge remains in effect today on all 
policies except automobile insurance, for which the surcharge has been fixed 
at 6 percent since 1985. The 1982 law also permitted private insurers to pass 
on, at their discretion, between 40 and 90 percent of their catastrophe risk (and, 
of course, the corresponding premiums) to a state-guaranteed reinsurer, the 
Caisse Centrale de Rkassurance (CCR). A stop-loss provision of the reinsur- 
ance contract, covering the retained portion of the risk, is triggered when the 
private insurer’s annual losses from covered catastrophes reach 150 percent of 
the annual catastrophe premiums that the insurer chose to retain. Although 
private insurers are not required to reinsure their catastrophe risks through the 
CCR, most have opted to do so. In recent years, private insurers in France have 
chosen to retain approximately 60 percent of catastrophe risk and pass on the 
remainder (along with all the risk above the stop-loss trigger) to the CCR. 
As the relatively high private retention levels suggest, the system has, so far 
at least, performed remarkably well. Except for the first year of operation (be- 
40. Most of the material presented here on French disaster policy is drawn from Dreyfus (1995). 
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fore the surcharge was increased to 9 percent) and 1994 (a year of exception- 
ally high disaster activity in France), catastrophe-reinsurance premiums paid 
to the CCR have always exceeded  the CCR’s catastrophe payments.  In fact, 
annual payment-to-premium  ratios  of  under  50 percent  are typical  for the 
CCR’s catastrophe-reinsurance program. To date, the state guaranty on CCR 
reinsurance has never been triggered. The French government still appropriates 
emergency funds in the aftermath of many large disasters to cover an assort- 
ment of uninsured damages, but the private-public insurance system now cov- 
ers the vast majority of losses. Overall, the system established in 1982 enjoys 
broadly based support-notably  from policyholders, private insurers, and pub- 
lic policy makers. “While both the French direct insurers and the CCR agree 
that there is room to improve the program,” reports one business publication, 
“no one challenges the basic tenets that led to the plan.” The report adds that 
the system “is considered an unqualified success by both buyers and insurers” 
(Kielmas 1996). 
The analysis of U.S. disaster coverage provided in this paper suggests that a 
system similar to that now working in France could be established with some 
benefit  in the United  States. Under  such a  system, the federal government 
would require that specific coverage against natural catastrophes be included 
in every property-insurance policy; it would mandate a premium surcharge to 
pay for the additional coverage; and it would establish a federally guaranteed 
reinsurance program allowing private insurers to cede most of the risk and the 
associated premiums to the federal government. 
Because the United States suffers, on average, from more natural catastro- 
phes and from a wider assortment of them than does France, such a policy 
would require several modest departures from the French model so as to better 
suit the American context. Instead of fixing the natural catastrophe surcharge 
at a flat percentage of base premiums (e.g., 9 percent in France), the U.S. sys- 
tem might provide for some variation  across regions. Citizens living in the 
most disaster-prone areas would pay the highest surcharge and citizens living 
in the least disaster-prone areas the lowest. Some cross-subsidization would 
still be necessary to make catastrophe insurance affordable in disaster-prone 
areas, but there would be no need to establish a single, flat-rate surcharge as in 
France. The basic surcharge could vary, for example, between 5 and 20 percent 
and average about 13 percent of base premiums. The surcharge on automobile 
insurance might be set at two-thirds of the basic surcharge, as in France. Pre- 
sumably, the catastrophe surcharge would not be applied at all to unrelated 
property and casualty lines, such as liability (both automobile and nonautomo- 
bile), workers’ compensation, and accident and health. 
If  this  schedule of  surcharges had  been  applied  between  1977 and  1993 
to the relevant lines of property insurance, annual receipts would have been 
enough to cover all private insurance payments for natural catastrophes as well 
as all federal disaster payments and still leave a cumulative surplus of nearly 
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property and casualty lines, the surplus at the end of 1993 would have totaled 
$148 billion. Indeed, if only half the basic surcharge (i.e., 6.5 percent for non- 
automobile insurance and 4.33 percent for automobile insurance) had been 
applied to all property and casualty lines, the cumulative surplus would have 
reached nearly $4 billion at the end of 1993 (see table 8.8). Clearly, a basic 
surcharge could be selected that would pay for catastrophe losses in the United 
States. Federal policymakers would have to decide which lines to include in 
the tax base and how much of a buffer they wished to build against potential 
rnegacata~trophes.~' 
American policymakers  might also consider requiring private insurers to 
reinsure through the federal reinsurance agency with little if any flexibility on 
private-retention levels. For example, the U.S. law might require private insur- 
ers to retain 30 percent of  natural catastrophe risk and to obtain reinsurance 
coverage for the next 70 percent, along with stop-loss protection on the re- 
tained risk, from the designated federal reinsurance  agency. This departure 
from the French model would help prevent American insurers from capturing 
the program's implicit cross-subsidies for themselves. Given the much greater 
variation in disaster vulnerability across regions in the United States as com- 
pared to France, a flexible public-reinsurance program would offer American 
insurers enormous opportunities for gaming the system and cherry picking 
risks. 
Naturally, a number of disadvantages would be associated with the adoption 
of even a modified version of the French system. For one thing, the federal 
government would be explicitly assuming yet another large contingent liability. 
But, since the federal government already stands as the implicit guarantor of 
both insurance companies and state-guarantee funds in the event of  a mega- 
catastrophe, it may  be reasonable to offer an explicit guaranty in return for 
some steady revenues in the form of premiums. Another apparent disadvantage 
is that cross-subsidization benefits those living in dangerous areas and penal- 
izes those living in safe areas, thus creating a significant moral hazard problem. 
But, again, since some level of cross-subsidization (and, in turn, moral hazard) 
is inevitable given public expectations about federal bailouts of disaster vic- 
tims, it seems reasonable for the government to move from ex post to ex ante 
subsidies in return for revenues. 
Perhaps the most serious problems associated with the proposed plan in- 
volve administrative issues. For example, how exactly would the federal gov- 
ernment build a reserve fund? It is quite possible that annual surpluses in the 
proposed reinsurance fund would simply be raided rather than saved. Alter- 
natively, democratically elected lawmakers might view reinsurance-fund sur- 
pluses as evidence that premiums were too high rather than as an indication 
41. As has  been  mentioned in  the text, the French system allows only one exception to the 
general rule of a flat 9 percent catastrophe surcharge on all non-life-insurance policies. The excep- 
tion relates to the surcharge on automobile-insurance policies, which is 6 percent, or two-thirds of 
the basic surcharge. Table 8.8  Financing Options for a French-Type Catastrophe  System in the United States: Three Possible Scenarios (in millions of 
current dollars) 
Revenues from 13%  Revenues from 
Private-Insurance  Total Public  Revenues from 13%  Basic Surcharge  6.5% Basic 
Loss Payments  Federal  and Private  Basic Surcharge  Applied to All  Surcharge Applied 
for Natural  Disaster  Disaster  Applied to Property  Property and  to All Property and 
Catastrophes  Payments  Payments  Lines Only"  Casualty Lines"  Casualty Linesa 
























































































































































































































Sources: Data courtesy of  Property Claim Services; Federal Disaster Assistance (1995, table  1. I, p. 5);  Besrk Aggregates and Averages-Property-Casualty  (1996, 
191-94). 
Nore: N.A. = not available. 
aThe  basic surcharge applies to nonautomobile policies. Automobile policies are assessed at two-thirds of  the basic surcharge. 
bSum of  potential revenues (in cols. 4,  5,  or 6) minus sum of actual payments (col. 3),  assuming no interest charges or receipts. 350  David A. Moss 
of  prudent preparation for large future catastrophes. After all, the American 
electorate has consistently demonstrated its interest in having both high bene- 
fits and low taxes. 
Nonetheless, the proposed system offers sufficient advantages over the cur- 
rent system to justify serious consideration. Most important, it would stabilize 
what is now a dangerously unstable system of natural disaster coverage-one 
in which insurance companies are running for cover, individual states are set- 
ting up financially fragile funds of  their own, and the federal government is 
finding itself unable to resist costly bailouts of the uninsured. 
As has been argued throughout the paper, this instability stems from two 
sources-one  associated with the economics and the other with the politics of 
natural disasters. On the economics side, growing uncertainty about disaster 
forecasting combined with a vague perception that disaster activity is likely to 
increase in the future has left private insurers skittish. Presumably, insurers 
would be willing to sell plenty of  natural catastrophe coverage in disaster- 
prone areas at some price, but a sufficiently high price would, in all likelihood, 
not only offend state regulators but also lead many propertyowners to dismiss 
catastrophe coverage as simply unaffordable. As a result, the markets for catas- 
trophe risks in disaster-prone areas are contracting. On the political side, pow- 
erful public expectations have forced the federal government to cover a large 
fraction of  uninsured disaster losses. The federal burden seems likely to in- 
crease in the future as a result of both the inherent moral hazard problem and 
a contracting private market for natural catastrophe risks. Since public subsidi- 
zation of propertyowners in disaster-prone areas represents a political reality 
in the United States, the relevant question is not how to eliminate subsidies but 
rather how to cross-subsidize most efficiently. 
A modified version of  the French system would be well suited to address 
this complex web of economic and political problems. First, it would rational- 
ize the market for disaster risk. By requiring disaster coverage to be a part of 
every property-insurance policy and establishing a federal reinsurance pro- 
gram, the proposed policy would not only make insurance against natural ca- 
tastrophes available to all (or nearly all) propertyowners but also eliminate the 
need for market-distorting regulations at the state level, such as those found in 
Florida and California. Equally important, the stop-loss feature of the proposed 
reinsurance contract would transform what is now paralyzing uncertainty into 
manageable risk by  shifting the liability for potential megacatastrophes from 
private insurers to the federal government. In this sense, the stop-loss provision 
represents a substitute for the proposed disaster-contingent-claims contracts 
because both address the problem of risk aversion on the part of insurers and 
reinsurers. The federal government is best positioned to reinsure the extraordi- 
nary risks associated with megacatastrophes because it boasts the deepest of 
all financial pockets. 
The second basic advantage of the proposed system is that it would stream- 
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of funds would become available to the federal government to compensate di- 
saster victims, and cross-subsidization, which already exists, would become 
far  more  transparent  and  predictable.  As  has  been  noted,  such  cross- 
subsidization would necessarily create a moral hazard problem. But it is hoped 
that a substantial (say, 30 percent) retention requirement would lead private 
insurers to refuse  coverage altogether for property in extremely  hazardous 
areas. Perhaps most important, once a publicly sponsored program to make 
disaster insurance widely available was in place, the federal government might 
find itself more credible when it threatened to withhold relief from those rela- 
tively few who remained uninsured. 
Clearly, the proposed system would not be perfect. Nor would it completely 
address the problem of natural disasters. The state and federal governments 
would still have to provide emergency assistance to disaster victims outside 
the reinsurance framework, and some particularly disaster-prone sectors of the 
economy-such  as agriculture-probably  would have to be dealt with sepa- 
rately, or at least on different terms. But I believe that the system proposed 
here would address many of  the key problems  highlighted  throughout  this 
paper. Above all, it would provide a framework for managing the two factors 
that have contributed most to a chaotic federal disaster policy: high and rising 
public expectations about automatic federal disaster relief, on the one hand, 
and the insurance industry’s mounting uncertainty about (and fear of) mega- 
catastrophes, on the other. 
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Comment  Clement S. Dwyer Jr. 
Florida is a microcosm of  the problem that the insurance industry faces na- 
tionally. 
There are four entities in Florida that deal with managing catastrophic risk 
in some fashion postevent: the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, the Flor- 
ida Wind Pool, the Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Undenvrit- 
ing Association,’ and the Guarantee Fund. In making sure that all these obliga- 
tions are met, the first layer of defense is the ability of the securities to assess 
the industry on the basis of market share. The second is the ability to assess- 
particularly in the case of  the Catastrophe Fund-all  policies in force for a 
period of twenty years after the event. Florida has, therefore, in effect created 
an assessable mutual company. And I’m not talking only about homeowner’s 
policies. I’m also talking about general liability policies, automobile policies, 
umbrella policies, whatever. The whole lot-except  for workers’ compensa- 
tion-can  be assessed to support catastrophe risk in the state. This is not what 
people think that they are getting when they contract for insurance coverage. 
Unfortunately, as Moss’s  paper makes  clear, the market  in this  state is at- 
tempting to spread over a single state a risk of catastrophe exposure too great 
to be so diversified. 
Florida presents us with a wonderful test case for the arguments surrounding 
the issues of affordability and availability of catastrophe insurance. In the wake 
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of Humcane Andrew, the Florida Commission on Hurricane Catastrophe Mod- 
els was created (with the support of academics as well as industry practitioners 
and modeling companies). One of the early crises with which the commission 
was faced was whether the insurance commissioner would be forced to accept 
the rates for wind that the models produced. The rationale advanced in Talla- 
hassee by Commissioner Nelson was that he was not going to give up control 
of the rate-setting process. What Florida presents us with, therefore, is an ex- 
ample of the political process standing in the way of market-clearing pricing. 
I would also like to address the issue of cancellation and nonrenewal laws 
in the United States, which are poorly understood by many people. How long 
do you think that it would take, say, the Hartford Insurance Company to cancel 
all its business in New York‘s Nassau and Suffolk Counties? It would take fifty 
years (assuming that all policyholders pay their premiums) because an insurer 
can cancel only 2 percent of its policies per year in New York State. What has 
happened is that the state’s insurance commissioner has expanded the FAIR 
Plan-and  is, in fact, proposing to expand coverage further, to all downstate 
counties. Again,  the market-clearing mechanisms of the private sector have 
been  badly  hindered  by  the  regulatory  process,  and  this  problem  is  com- 
pounded as one moves across the country. 
Another issue with which I have been struggling since coming to this confer- 
ence is one involving the law of large numbers, where the loss of the few falls 
on the shoulders of the many. When does one cross from where the law of large 
numbers works to where it presents instead the problem of discrimination and 
cross-subsidization? Basic underwriting theory is a process of discriminating 
between good risks and bad.  Unfortunately,  that is not an easy thing to do. 
Moss raises the issue of  cross-subsidization, and I myself believe that this is 
an issue that our society as a whole must address, but I am not  sure of the 
proper forum in which to address it. 
Specifically, the problem is whether the people of North Dakota should pay 
more for insurance so that the people of Palm Beach County can build expen- 
sive homes at the shore. I do not know how we can resolve this debate unless 
the country is prepared  to accept coverage that is mandated  at the point  at 
which the mortgage originates. There is a clear conflict inherent in the opera- 
tion of McCarran Ferguson, which delegates insurance regulation both to the 
states and to the federal government-the  authority of the federal government 
extending only to those matters not explicitly delegated to the states. The insur- 
ance commissioners in North Dakota, Michigan, and Massachusetts therefore 
have a stake in the game in Florida. And the people clearly believe in them- 
not one elected insurance commissioner was not reelected in the most recent 
round of elections. 
Moss’s paper does a wonderful job of tracing the expansion of our society’s 
expectations-pointing  out that the nation  as a whole is indeed prosperous 
enough to fulfill those expectations if it so desires. As far as the issue of federal 
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that the proposed catastrophe bonds, Treasury catastrophe notes, and similar 
devices are excellent ideas because with them one develops a transparent price 
for the tail end of the distributions of losses. The reinsurance community does 
support such a development. We  may, however, be expecting too much. This 
country works on a pay-as-you-go basis. And nothing will change unless a dif- 
ferent political will is brought to the process than has been evinced hereto- 
fore. 
In  conclusion, I think that it will unfortunately take a major calamity to 
rationalize the system. Only then will the interested parties-the  private sector, 
the consumer, the state regulator, and the federal regulator-recognize  that 
they all must give up something. I don’t say that this is a good way to solve the 
problem, but it may be the only way. 
Comment  R. Glenn Hubbard 
David Moss’s illuminating paper considers the current state of federal disaster 
policy from a historical perspective. In a sweeping discussion of the evolution 
of federal disaster-relief  policy since 1803 (when Congress assisted the victims 
of a fire in Portsmouth, N.H.), Moss highlights the rapid expansion of federal 
intervention after 1960. Arguing that this expansion is consistent with broader 
trends in government intervention in risk management, he suggests that expec- 
tations about intervention constrain the potential for rationalizing disaster pol- 
icy. If  unchecked, these expectations and constraints may lead to an exit of 
private insurers, further increasing disaster costs to taxpayers. Moss’s paper 
closes by  describing potential reforms and suggesting that the French policy 
of  government reinsurance of  natural catastrophe risks may  serve as a good 
model for U.S. disaster policy in the future. 
After describing the setting of the problems considered by Moss, I will orga- 
nize my remarks in three areas: (1) lessons from political economy, (2) lessons 
from social insurance design, and (3) the role of private markets in disaster- 
risk management. While I will not discuss them in any detail, I recommend 
Moss’s historical descriptions of disaster policy to anyone interested in the de- 
velopment of this increasingly costly area of federal intervention. 
The Setting 
Costs of  property catastrophes in the United States have reached unprec- 
edented  levels  in  the  1990s.  Total  insured  losses  from  natural  disasters 
amounted to $75 billion between 1989 and 1995, where as they were only $51 
billion for the whole of  the period between 1950 and 1988 (see Borden and 
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Sarkar  1996). In addition, two developments suggest that high costs will re- 
main for the foreseeable future. First, rising catastrophe-related  costs offer 
some evidence that catastrophic risk has increased significantly in recent years. 
Second, rapid population growth in catastrophe-prone areas indicates a contin- 
uing trend toward increased costs of catastrophes. These developments do not 
bode well for private insurers. As a point of reference, U.S. primary-insurance- 
industry capital is about $20 billion (Canter, Cole, and Sandor, in press). This 
greater exposure raises the question of what role the federal government should 
play in disaster insurance or, more broadly, in disaster policy. 
Federal intervention has grown in ad hoc phases and in systematic phases. 
Prior to the 1920s, federal responses were largely minor and coordinated with 
the Red Cross. Following the disastrous Mississippi Flood of 1927, the federal 
government increased spending on flood relief and effectively assumed respon- 
sibility for flood-control projects (see also the popular account in Barry 1997). 
The Federal  Disaster Act of  1950 authorized  a permanent relief fund with 
broad discretion (giving future officials the opportunity to feel their constit- 
uents’ pain). This scope for intervention was expanded further by  the  1970 
disaster relief act. In tandem with relief polices, federal disaster insurance ex- 
panded in the 1960s and 1970s. The National Flood Insurance Act of  1968 and 
the Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 tried to substitute a federally backed 
insurance program for ad hoc disaster relief, but participation by propertyown- 
ers was poor. In 1978, the Federal Energy Management Agency (FEMA) was 
created to coordinate disaster programs distributed across several government 
agencies and to consolidate the management of escalating spending. 
The Great Midwest Flood of  1993 was the proverbial watershed event in 
federal disaster relief, with FEMA overseeing the expenditure of more than $1 
billion of disaster insurance (compared to the $10 million spent by the govern- 
ment in response to the 1927 flood). The Clinton administration requested ad- 
ditional payments to communities, small businesses, and farmers. 
The problems emerge from this evolution of federal disaster relief and insur- 
ance policy. First, potential budget costs are significant, in the light of a federal 
commitment with no clearly articulated limits. Second, past government be- 
havior makes statements that aid will not be forthcoming to individuals not 
meeting particular criteria or following prescribed rules not credible. Third, 
the combination of an expanding federal commitment and increased uncer- 
tainty about catastrophe risk may lead to widespread exit by private insurers 
putting further pressure on federal disaster intervention. 
These concerns have led to proposals at the state and federal levels. Florida 
and California have established insurers or reinsurers of  last resort, although 
states are poorly equipped to diversify catastrophe risks. At the federal level, 
1994 legislation tightened enforcement of flood-insurance requirements in the 
National Flood Insurance Program, although credibility issues remain. The in- 
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Corporation (NDIC), to be financed and administered collectively by  private 
insurance; the NDIC would cap private insurers’ disaster liability and would 
be authorized to borrow from the U.S. Treasury in the event of severe catastro- 
phes. The Clinton administration proposed  selling disaster-contingent claims 
on the open market, but the administration’s proposal does little to encourage 
the development of private markets. The historical record suggests, however, 
that pressure for cross-subsidization across regions and credibility problems 
will limit the potential for success of the scheme. 
Outside the United  States, Moss identifies the French Caisse Centrale de 
RCassurance (CCR) as a possible model for reform. Mapping the scheme to 
the US.  setting, a CCR-like approach would suggest the following. The federal 
government would require that specific coverage against natural catastrophes 
be included  in every property-insurance policy. In addition, a premium  sur- 
charge would be mandated to pay for the additional coverage. Finally, such a 
plan would establish a federally guaranteed reinsurance program, allowing pri- 
vate insurers to cede most of risk (and premiums) to the government.  I  will 
return to this proposal in the context of social insurance below. 
Lessons from Political Economy 
As Moss’s paper makes clear, economic analysis of government disaster pol- 
icy must address “political economy” as well as “optimal policy” considera- 
tions. Historical developments in the U.S. banking industry offer some guid- 
ance for the present case. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
losses (generally by smaller, poorly diversified banks) in particular regions of 
a state generated  political  pressure for redistribution within a state-in  the 
form of state deposit-insurance schemes (see, e.g., the discussion in Econom- 
ides, Hubbard,  and  Palia  1996). The subsequent  failure of  state insurance 
schemes in the presence of larger banking crises (“catastrophes”) led to politi- 
cal pressure for federal cross-subsidization  (among banks and among regions 
of the country) of risk bearing through federal deposit insurance. 
As is by now well known, the government assumption of bank deposit-risk 
management through  deposit insurance failed key tests of  insurance design. 
The presence of large amounts of insured or effectively insured deposits cre- 
ated the potential for moral hazard precisely when adverse shocks to industry 
capital appeared (as in the savings-and-loan  industry in the early  1980s and 
the banking industry in the late 1980s). Moreover, it is difficult to motivate 
U.S.-styled deposit insurance as simply a response to a market failure. 
Lessons  from  U.S.  banking  regulatory  experience  have  shaped  present 
banking-regulation proposals and offer guidance for casualty insurance. Chief 
among these are the importance of risk-based pricing and an expanded role for 
private markets in reinsurance of deposits to ensure market discipline. Econo- 
mists generally argue that a public lender of  last resort (such as the Federal 
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For disaster policy, experience of the political economy of banking regula- 
tion suggests the need to be wary of excessive cross-subsidization of risk and 
the need to encourage the develop of private reinsurance and market discipline. 
Lessons from Social Insurance 
Sidestepping the political economy of intervention, how might we set up a 
“social insurance” approach to disaster policy? The basic problem is that of 
systematic risk-in  this case, the chance of a major catastrophe or series of 
major catastrophes that might bankrupr the private-insurance industry. 
Social insurance principles suggest a way of organizing thoughts about de- 
posit insurance. First, to mitigate the free-rider problem so endemic to disaster 
insurance, coverage for individuals and businesses must be (credibly) manda- 
tory. Second, deductibles and coinsurance should align incentives for risk man- 
agement by the insured. Third, private-sector reinsurance should be mobilized 
to pool risks across insurers in different regions with different exposures to 
catastrophic risks. Fourth, as in the banking  analogy, the government’s role 
would be limited to that of a lender of last resort. In the insurance context, this 
amounts to the combination of a catastrophic payment (mandatory insurance) 
with a deductible and coinsurance. The “lender-of-last-resort” role would re- 
place ad hoc interventions. 
To be successful, such a scheme based on social insurance principles must 
develop strong markets for private reinsurance. I say this for two reasons. First, 
private-reinsurance markets offer market discipline in the pricing and manage- 
ment of catastrophic disk. Second, absent well-functioning and deep private- 
reinsurance markets, the temptation for ad hoc government intervention in a 
disaster with large private losses becomes great, undermining the credibility 
of overall disaster policy. 
Enhanced Role for Private Markets 
The key to the improvement of private catastrophe insurance and reinsur- 
ance markets is the development and promotion of property-catastrophe-risk 
financial instruments (“securitization”) of risk. In addition to the desirability 
of liquid financial markets for risk management, insurers have few additional 
avenues of assistance. Escalating prices for reinsurance combined with lower 
coverage amounts have made it more difficult for insurance companies to miti- 
gate their risk through reinsurance.  In addition, state regulatory  restrictions 
limit (and in some cases prevent) companies from increasing premiums and 
reducing coverage in response to higher costs of reinsurance. 
Since  1992,  several  financial  instruments  have  emerged  to  securitize 
property-catastrophe risk. These instruments include exchange-traded options 
and futures, over-the-counter insurance products, and insurance swaps. As a 
consequence, individuals or businesses can take positions on the occurrence 
and cost of  property catastrophes. Insurance companies can hedge their ex- 361  Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803 
posure by transferring property-catastrophe risk to a wide pool of willing in- 
vestors. 
While securitization represents an important and necessary development in 
enhancing the private sector’s role in catastrophe management,  instrument- 
design issues remain. Catastrophe-risk exposures can be specified by, for ex- 
ample, location, disaster type, and time of year. One must also sort out which 
participants bear which type of investment risk (i.e., among liquidity risk, basis 
risk, credit risk, adverse selection, or moral hazard). The most successful fi- 
nancial instruments will be those with low costs imposed by these investment 
risks. 
For example, property-catastrophe options (traded on the Chicago Board of 
Trade [CBOT]  ) offer one approach. Most trades create “call spreads” compara- 
ble to purchasing a layer of insurance. The options offer minimal credit risk 
(given the role of the CBOT clearinghouse) and basis risk (unless for an insur- 
ance company because the payoff is based on aggregate industry claim pay- 
ments). Adverse selection is minimized by the use of standardized instruments; 
moral hazard is mitigated by the use of an industry-based index. These advan- 
tages notwithstanding, liquidity risk remains a concern because of the low trad- 
ing volume; many analysts believe that higher volume and lower liquidity risk 
are likely in the future (see Borden and Sarkar 1996). 
Catastrophe bonds (or “act-of-God” bonds) are an example of an over-the- 
counter instrument. Such bonds create a link between the repayment and the 
catastrophe  with  variable  coupon  and  principal  repayments.  As  with  the 
exchange-traded  projects,  liquidity  risk  remains  a  problem.  Unlike  the 
exchange-traded products, credit risk must be borne. While basis risk is nonex- 
istent, the customized nature of the bonds could lead to adverse selection (if 
only the riskier insurance companies issue the bonds) and moral hazard (if the 
repayment is related to the issuer’s individual catastrophe costs). 
Finally, property-catastrophe  swaps to be traded on the Catastrophic Risk 
Exchange (CATEX) are at an early stage of development. The swap is a bilat- 
eral agreement with reciprocal reinsurance between two insurers. Units of ex- 
change are standardized by  specifying “equivalent” risks and exposures. It is 
too early to assess the liquidity risk associated with these products. Counter- 
party credit risk must be borne. Basis risk, adverse selection, and moral hazard 
depend on the attributes of the individual swap design. 
To summarize, recent market developments suggest that private markets can 
play  a  larger  role  in  property-catastrophe  risk  management.  Risks can be 
spread across a broader pool of individuals and business. These developments 
can reduce the effect of catastrophes on the insurance industry as a whole. 
Conclusion 
David Moss’s interesting and readable paper highlights the need for econo- 
mists, industry leaders, and policymakers to rethink federal disaster policy in 362  David A. Moss 
the United States. The history of federal involvement in disaster insurance and 
relief-combined  with experience with government intervention in risk man- 
agement in other industries-leads  one to be concerned  about  the need to 
maintain  healthy  private markets for managing  risk. Lessons from both the 
political economy of regulation and social insurance design point out the need 
for well-functioning private-reinsurance mechanism. Recent developments of 
financial instruments for managing property-catastrophe  risk offer an encour- 
aging sign for private-insurance and -reinsurance markets in the future. 
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